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ABSTRACT 
 
Earnings and book value are commonly used as the basis for firm valuation. However, 
the reliability of earnings, as indicated by earnings management, may affect its 
relevance in determining firm value. This thesis investigates the link between earnings 
management and firm valuation by assessing the impact of earnings management on the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value.  
Three different sources of earnings management are investigated: total discretionary 
accruals, short-term discretionary accruals, and long-term discretionary accruals. Total 
discretionary accruals are estimated using the Jones model (Jones 1991). New models 
are developed to estimate short-term and long-term discretionary accruals. These 
models enable investigation of the differential impact of earnings management via 
short-term versus earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals. The 
primary proposition is that earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals 
has a greater impact on the value-relevance of earnings and book value than earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals. 
For firm’s whose discretionary accruals indicate earnings management, the value-
relevance of earnings is expected to be lower than for firms without earnings 
management. Moreover, in the presence of earnings management, it is expected that 
there will be a shift from a reliance on earnings to a reliance on book value in the 
valuation process. This would be reflected in a decrease in the value-relevance of 
earnings and an increase in the value-relevance of book value. 
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This thesis provides evidence that earnings management plays a role in the valuation 
process. A major contribution of this study is the development of models to enable the 
estimation of short-term and long-term discretionary accruals, thereby extending the 
earnings management literature by addressing the differential effect of short-term versus 
long-term discretionary accruals. The results clearly demonstrate that low reliability of 
information reduces its value-relevance. This link between the integrity of accounting 
information and its usefulness to market participants supports the need for ongoing 
regulatory activity to improve the integrity of the financial reporting process.  
Preliminary results demonstrate the value-relevance of earnings and book value using 
Australian data. The effect of earnings management on the relative value-relevance of 
these accounting measures depends on the source of earnings management. Earnings 
management via total discretionary accruals has no impact. When examined 
independently, earnings management via either short-term or long-term discretionary 
accruals reduces the value-relevance of earnings but has no impact on the value 
relevance of book value. Examination of both measures simultaneously reveals the 
differential impact of short-term versus long-term discretionary accruals. Earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals has no impact, whereas earnings 
management via long-term discretionary accruals reduces the value-relevance of 
earnings and increases the value-relevance of book value. Therefore, it is concluded that 
earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals has a greater impact on the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value than earnings management via short-term 
discretionary accruals.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
Firm value is derived from the market’s expectations of firm performance. Accounting 
provides the necessary information for the market to form these expectations. Book 
value of equity represents past performance and current earnings are indicative of future 
performance. Thus, these measures are commonly used as the basis for firm valuation 
(Easton and Harris 1991; Wild 1992; Ohlson 1995; Penman 1998; Ou and Sepe 2002).  
This study proposes that the reliability of accounting information may affect its 
relevance to the market in determining firm value. The earnings figure is susceptible to 
manipulation that may reduce its reliability and thus its usefulness in the valuation 
process. This is due to the accrual component of earnings which is, in part, subject to 
managerial discretion. Because Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
allow a degree of freedom, this pliancy may be exploited by management (Levitt 1998). 
The prospect of exploitation increases when incentives exist for management to 
manipulate the accrual component of earnings to reach specific earnings targets (Beaver 
and Engel 1996; Dechow et al 1996; Wu 1997; Teoh et al 1998b; Erickson and Wang 
1999; Holland and Ramsay 2003). 
The rationale for the use of accrual accounting is that it allows management to adjust 
cash flows to better reflect the performance and position of the firm. In this context, 
accruals are used as a signal to the market. However, when managers use accruals to 
opportunistically manage earnings, the earnings measure is not a reliable indicator of 
the firm’s financial performance. Accordingly, such opportunistic behavior will reduce 
the usefulness of the information contained in earnings. The difficulty for market 
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participants is to identify when accruals are used as a credible signal and when they are 
used opportunistically; that is, market participants must assess whether earnings are 
reliable. 
1.2 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND THE RELIABILITY OF 
EARNINGS 
The Conceptual Framework identifies relevance and reliability as the key characteristics 
of accounting information used in making valuation decisions. Information is relevant 
when it influences users’ decisions by helping them to form predictions and/or confirm 
or correct past evaluations. Information is reliable if it can be depended upon to 
faithfully represent, without bias or undue error, the transactions or events that it 
purports to represent (Statement of Accounting Concepts – SAC 3 [Australia]; 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts – SFAC 2 [US]). SAC 3 and SFAC 2 not 
only define these concepts but also emphasize their interrelationship.  
While the conceptual framework suggests an integral relationship between relevance 
and reliability, it is the reliability of accounting information that is significant to market 
participants. For information to be value-relevant, it must be both relevant and reliable 
in terms of the definition provided in the conceptual framework (Barth et al 2001). 
Therefore, the absence of value-relevance may indicate a lack of relevance and/or a lack 
of reliability. As the conceptual framework predicates the relevance of accounting 
information to decision makers, then low value-relevance may be attributed to low 
reliability.  
There are three accounting summary measures presented in a firm’s financial statements 
that may have questionable reliability; (1) earnings, as reported in the Statement of 
 
3
Financial Performance, (2) book value of equity, or net assets, as reported in the 
Statement of Financial Position, and (3) net cash flows, as reported in the Statement of 
Cash Flows. As these measures provide information about the financial performance 
and position of the firm, they are potentially relevant in determining the firm value 
subject to a reliability assessment by the market. 
Support for the value-relevance of earnings comes from studies of the earnings response 
coefficients. These studies demonstrate the value-relevance of earnings in a variety of 
contexts (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Collins and Kothari 1989; Easton and Harris 1991). 
The cash and accrual components of earnings were extensively investigated through 
comparisons of cash flows versus earnings, and more recently, cash flows versus 
accruals (Wilson 1986; Bowen et al 1987; Dechow 1994; Cheng et al 1996; Cotter 
1996; Subramanyam 1996). The relative superiority of earnings over cash flows in 
predicting stock returns is well documented (Beaver and Dukes 1972; Wilson 1986; 
Dechow 1994). 
Book value is considered to be value-relevant when a firm’s book value proxies for 
expected future normal earnings, assuming the firm is a going concern (Penman 1992; 
Ohlson 1995). In addition, book value may become a proxy for the liquidation value of 
the firm when the firm is not a going concern (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Barth et 
al 1998). Evidence indicates that book value plays a role in valuation for firms with 
losses when the losses are transitory. In this case, the role of book value may either be 
as a proxy for the abandonment option (Berger et al 1996) or for the expected future 
normal earnings (Collins et al 1999). 
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Both earnings and book value are value-relevant with the exclusion of one, or the other, 
leading to a possible misspecification of the valuation model (Easton and Harris 1991; 
Ohlson 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Barth et al 1998, Collins et al 1999). 
Investigations of changes in the value-relevance of these measures since the late 1950’s 
found that the value-relevance of earnings has declined, but that this has been offset by 
the increased value-relevance of book value. Overall, the combined value-relevance of 
the two measures has not declined (Collins et al 1997; Francis and Schipper 1999).  
It is an empirical question as to which measure, earnings or book value, is the superior 
measure of firm value. However, the literature suggests that if the reliability of one 
measure is low, other measures will become more value-relevant (Berger et al 1996; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Collins et al 1997; Barth et al 1998). This study focuses 
on the reliability of earnings when assessing the relative value-relevance of earnings and 
book value.  
1.3 EARNINGS, BOOK VALUE & EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: 
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM DISCRETIONARY 
ACCRUALS 
Earnings reliability becomes questionable when motivation exists for the manipulation 
of earnings (Brown 1999; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and Skinner 2000; 
Rosenfield 2000; Duncan 2001). When a firm engages in earnings management, the 
earnings figure may no longer be a true and fair reflection of firm performance thus 
reducing the reliability of earnings. When information is unreliable it is unlikely to be 
useful as the basis for firm valuation. Thus, earnings management may result in a 
decline in the value-relevance of earnings. As the earnings measure becomes less 
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reliable, the market may look to book value as an alternate measure of value, thereby 
leading to an increase in the value-relevance of book value. 
The accrual component of earnings may be a potent detractor from the reliability of 
earnings. If management uses accruals to adjust cash flows to present a credible signal 
to the market, then earnings should remain value-relevant. However, if accruals are used 
opportunistically by management, the reliability of the earnings figure is undermined 
and thus should be less value-relevant.  
Total accruals can be decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary components. 
Non-discretionary accruals are required by the accounting standards and are influenced 
by a firm’s economic circumstances. Consequently, they are relatively free from 
managerial discretion. However, discretionary accruals may be the result of 
opportunistic behavior and therefore lead to a decline in the perceived reliability of 
earnings. As the discretionary component of accruals provides management with the 
opportunity to manipulate earnings, they are used as an indicator of earnings 
management (Jones 1991; Boynton et al 1992; DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994; Dechow et 
al 1995; Teoh et al 1998a, 1998b; Bartov et al 2001; Bowman and Navissi 2003)1. The 
body of literature investigating this opportunistic behavior is known as “Earnings 
Management”. 
The motivation for this body of literature is the detection of earnings management 
(Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; Dechow et al 1995) or the identification of 
circumstances in which earnings management is most likely to occur (McNichols and 
                                                 
1 These studies either separate accruals based on some threshold level (e.g. those above the median), or 
use a matched pair design where selected companies are likely to manage earnings. 
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Wilson 1988; DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994; Perry and Williams 1994; Wu 1997; 
Erickson and Wang 1999; Kasnik 1999; Black et al 2000; Wells 2002). There is also 
some evidence of a link between earnings management, as evidenced by discretionary 
accruals, and stock prices (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al 1998a, 1998b). For example, firms 
with higher levels of discretionary accruals prior to stock issues tend to have poorer 
post-issue stock price performance. What has not been examined is the impact of 
earnings management on the value-relevance of earnings and book value. 
The fact that all accruals reverse, but do so differentially, may influence the way in 
which management may manipulate accruals. Management may find it difficult to 
conceal the manipulation of short-term accruals as the market expects these accruals to 
reverse within one accounting period. As long-term accruals tend to reverse further into 
the future, they provide management with the opportunity to conceal their 
manipulations for longer than if short-term accruals were used. Some accruals such as 
future income tax benefits and liabilities do not appear to reverse at all. 
Both short-term and long-term accruals provide incremental information to the market. 
In general, short-term accruals are more value-relevant than long-term accruals (Wilson 
1986; Chia et al 1997; Guay and Sidhu 2001), however, the impact of long-term 
accruals increases as the return interval increases (Cotter 1996; Guay and Sidhu 2001). 
This reflects the different roles played by short-term and long-term accruals in 
alleviating timing and matching problems, thus providing management with alternatives 
in the use of discretionary accruals. The discretionary nature of short-term versus long-
term accruals has not been addressed in the literature. 
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The commonly used measures of discretionary accruals have a short-term focus (Healy 
1985; DeAngelo 1986; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Jones 1991; DeFond and Jimbalvo 
1994; Dechow et al 1995). Consequently, the manipulation of long-term discretionary 
accruals has not been adequately examined. There is a need to investigate both short-
term and long-term discretionary accruals to better evaluate the impact of earnings 
management on the value-relevance of financial statement information.  
1.4 ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
This research investigates the relative value-relevance of both earnings and book value 
in the presence of earnings management. Total discretionary accruals, short-term 
discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary accruals, are potential sources of 
earnings management. Where discretionary accruals indicate opportunistic behavior, the 
market should respond negatively. All firms are expected to have some level of 
discretionary accruals so the mere presence of discretionary accruals is not in itself an 
indicator of earnings management. At any given time, one can expect discretionary 
accruals to range across firms from those that are information relevant to the prediction 
of permanent earnings (hereafter referred to as “low” discretionary accruals) to those 
that do not relate to future permanent earnings (hereafter referred to as “high” 
discretionary accruals)2. In other words, it is assumed that within a given industry a firm 
with high discretionary accruals is more likely to have engaged in earnings management 
than a firm with low discretionary accruals.  
                                                 
2 This construct is operationalized in Chapter 3. However, the construct is relative in that what are high 
accruals in an absolute sense may be low accruals from an earnings management perspective. 
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Earnings management, as measured by high discretionary accruals, may reduce the 
reliability of earnings and thus the value-relevance of earnings. The value-relevance of 
book value may increase as the market looks for an alternate source of information. The 
magnitude of these effects will differ depending on whether the discretionary accruals 
are short-term or long-term. Long-term discretionary accruals are expected to have a 
greater impact than short-term discretionary accruals on the value-relevance of the 
accounting measures because their effects will be apparent over a longer time period. 
The value-relevance of earnings and book value is measured by the market’s response 
to this information. As stock prices reflect aggregate investor behavior, the market 
response is measured by the coefficients in a regression model using stock price as the 
dependent variable and earnings and book value as the independent variables. The 
moderating effect of earnings management is assessed through the inclusion of a 
dummy variable in the valuation model to represent the presence of earnings 
management. The indicator of earnings management is determined using each of total, 
short-term, and long-term discretionary accruals. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This study develops a link between valuation research and earnings management 
research. Earnings management literature has primarily focused on the detection of 
earnings management with little consideration given to impact of earnings management 
on the value-relevance of accounting information. This study will provide evidence that 
earnings management plays a role in the valuation process. 
Standard setters and regulators have assumed that earnings management decreases the 
reliability of accounting information. Earnings management research supports a value 
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effect for the manipulation of earnings information but has not provided guidance for 
book value. The interactive impact of earnings management on market value is 
examined in this study through inclusion of both earnings and book value in the 
valuation model. This research extends the earnings management literature by 
addressing the differential impact of short-term versus long-term discretionary accruals. 
The existing discretionary accrual models do not distinguish between the short-term and 
long-term components of discretionary accruals. This study presents a method for 
identifying these components through the development of a new model for long-term 
discretionary accruals. Consequently, standard setters and regulators will be better able 
to target the area of earnings management that has the greater impact on the reliability 
of information. That is, whether it is short-term or long-term accruals that provide the 
greater manipulation effect.  
1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter Two develops the theory underlying the proposed model, which embodies the 
influence of earnings management on the value-relevance of accounting information. 
The theoretical constructs are identified and justified through examination of existing 
research. The chapter concludes with the presentation of propositions. 
Chapter Three outlines the research method used to test the propositions presented in 
Chapter Two. The chapter commences with an overview of the models and restatement 
of the propositions as hypotheses to be empirically tested. A description of the data 
collection procedures is followed by an explanation of the operationalization of the 
theoretical constructs. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the analysis 
procedures. 
 
10
Chapter Four starts with the preliminary analysis of the sample. This is followed by the 
presentation of the results of the model estimations and the inferences drawn from the 
tests of the hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the sensitivity 
analysis undertaken to evaluate the robustness of the results. 
Chapter Five provides a summary of the research question and presents the conclusions 
based on the results in Chapter Four. Limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research are also discussed. The conclusion restates this study’s contribution to 
knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 2 THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One identifies the role of earnings management in the valuation process as an 
issue for investigation. Of particular interest is the impact of earnings management on 
the value-relevance of earnings and book value.  Moreover, there is a need to explore 
the differential impact of the use of short-term and long-term discretionary accruals as 
earnings management tools.  
Section 2.2 of this chapter presents the general model to assess the extent to which 
earnings management moderates the value-relevance of accounting information. Section 
2.3 discusses the conceptual basis for the model that relates earnings and book value to 
market value. Following this, section 2.4 reviews the earnings management and accruals 
literature and states the propositions relating earnings management to the value-
relevance of earnings and book value. Limitations of the model are presented in section 
2.5. Section 2.6 summarizes the chapter and stated propositions. 
2.2 MODEL OVERVIEW 
The impact of financial statement information on capital markets is an enduring and 
well documented area of research (Kothari 2001). The value-relevance stream of this 
research is based on the premise that if information is useful, investors will adjust their 
behavior and the market will respond through changes in stock prices. Therefore, 
information is considered value-relevant if stock price movements are associated with 
the release of the information. To understand the impact of earnings manipulation on 
value requires a valuation model that links accounting information to market value. 
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Ohlson (1995) proposed a valuation framework that links firm value to earnings and 
book value, with both measures contributing to the value of the firm. Book value is 
presented as a proxy for the present value of expected future normal earnings, whilst 
current earnings proxy for abnormal earnings. In his model, firm value is dependent on 
book value, abnormal earnings and other information. Firm value is represented by 
stock price which is the measure of market value. 
t2
a
t1tt vxyP α+α+=  
Where   
Pt = stock price at time t 
yt = book value at time t 
a
tx = abnormal earnings for period t-1 to t 
vt = other information 
The empirical application of Ohlson’s model (Ohlson 1995) requires the “other 
information” variable to be replaced with an intercept and an error term. 
Pt = β0 + β1 Et +β2 BVt + εt     
Where 
Pt = stock price at time t 
Et = earnings for period t-1 to t 
BVt = book value at time t 
εt = error term 
The relevance of accounting information in determining the value of the firm is 
influenced by the market’s perception of the reliability of that information. As 
discretionary accruals may be indicative of the opportunistic manipulation of earnings, 
they can be used as an indicator of earnings reliability. When the reliability of earnings 
declines, the market may place less reliance on earnings and look for other sources of 
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information, such as book value. However, as book value is only one of a number of 
alternate sources of information, the decline in the value-relevance of earnings may not 
be exactly offset by the increase in the value-relevance of book value, resulting in a 
change in the overall reliance on these two measures. 
Figure 2-1 depicts the relationship between accounting information and market value. 
Both earnings and book value are expected to have a positive association with market 
value reflecting the value-relevance of these accounting measures. Earnings 
management plays a moderating role, impacting on the association between the 
accounting measures and market value. Earnings management may reduce the reliability 
of earnings, thereby reducing the value-relevance of earnings. In other words, earnings 
management may have a negative impact on the association between earnings and 
market value. When earnings are perceived to be unreliable, the market may look for 
other information such as book value on which to base its valuation. Earnings 
management may therefore have a positive impact on the association between book 
value and market value, thereby enhancing the value-relevance of book value. 
Figure 2-1: Earnings Management Valuation Model 
Earnings
Book
Value
Earnings
Management
Market
Value
+
+
+
–
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The investigation is extended to examine the differential effect of earnings management 
via short-term discretionary accruals and earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals on the value-relevance of earnings and book value. As long-term 
accruals are potentially more susceptible to earning management than short-term 
accruals, the impact on value-relevance is expected to be more pronounced for long-
term discretionary accruals. 
2.3 CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE MODEL 
2.3.1 Value-relevance of Earnings 
The value-relevance of earnings is demonstrated in the early works of Ball and Brown 
(1968), Beaver and Dukes (1972) and Patell and Kaplan (1977). Previous studies that 
examined earnings and cash flows in terms of their information content found that each 
measure provides incremental information when used in conjunction with the other 
(Rayburn 1986; Wilson 1986; Bowen et al 1987; Livnat and Zarowin 1990; Percy and 
Stokes 1992; Cheng et al 1996; Pfeiffer et al 1998).  
The study by Dechow (1994) was one of the first to investigate the relative superiority 
of earnings versus cash flows as a predictor of returns. Over short intervals, earnings 
displayed a stronger association with returns than did cash flows. Dechow (1994) 
proposed that when a firm is experiencing changes in working capital requirements and 
investing and financing activities, cash flows may have severe matching and timing 
problems and as such would be less able to reflect performance. Results indicate that 
under such conditions earnings are superior to cash flows in explaining returns, thereby 
suggesting that accruals enhance the ability of earnings to reflect firm performance.  
  
15
The persistence or permanence of earnings influences the value-relevance of earnings, 
with the market assigning greater weight to persistent earnings than to those that are 
perceived as transitory (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Collins and Kothari 1989; Lipe 1990; 
Ali and Zarowin 1992a, 1992b; Cheng et al 1996; Sloan 1996). Sloan (1996) examined 
earnings quality in relation to the persistence of the accrual and cash flow components 
of earnings. Sloan’s (1996) results reveal a reliance on the earnings figure regardless of 
its composition. Although cash flows were found to be more persistent than accruals, 
suggesting they should be more value-relevant, the market did not appear to weight cash 
flows more heavily than accruals. These results demonstrate that the market does not 
differentiate between the permanence of these two components of earnings. Sloan 
(1996) suggests this indicates possible mispricing by the market due to a fixation on 
earnings. 
Many of the studies into the persistence of earnings have used earnings levels and 
earnings changes to discriminate between the permanent and transitory components 
(Easton and Harris 1991; Biddle and Seow 1991; Cheng et al 1996; Baber et al 1999). 
These studies found that both earnings and earnings changes are value-relevant. Cheng 
et al (1996) used both levels and changes to investigate the effect of earnings 
permanence on the information content of cash flows. Findings indicate that a decrease 
in the permanence of earnings results in a decrease in value-relevance of earnings and 
an increase in the value-relevance of cash flows. This suggests that the market looks to 
cash flows as an alternative source of information if inadequacies are perceived in the 
earnings number. Similarly, book value can be used by the market as an alternate source 
of information for valuation purposes.  
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2.3.2 Value-relevance of Book Value 
The potential lack of reliability of the earnings figure has led investors to look to book 
value as measure of value. Collins et al (1997) investigated the causes of the shift in 
focus from earnings to book value. These causes include the increasing magnitude and 
frequency of abnormal and extraordinary items (Elliott and Hanna 1996), the increasing 
occurrence of reported losses (Hayn 1995), the decline in firm size (Wild 1992), and the 
increase in the incidence of intangibles (Amir and Lev 1996). These factors, which are 
linked to a reduction in the value-relevance of earnings, have also been shown to be 
associated with an increase in the value-relevance of book value (Berger et al 1996; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Collins et al 1997; Barth et al 1998). 
A number of studies have investigated the impact of various factors on the relative 
value-relevance of earnings versus book value. Table 2-1 identifies the circumstances in 
which greater reliance is placed on book value rather than on earnings. 
Table 2-1  Studies on the value-relevance of book value versus earnings 
Study Greater Value-Relevance of Book Value  
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a Low ROE 
Penman 1998 Extreme ROE 
Barth et al 1998 Deterioration in firm’s financial health 
Collins et al 1999 Net losses; Increase in firm’s risk of liquidation 
Ou and Sepe 2002 High forecasted change in earnings 
Book value can be viewed as a proxy for expected future earnings for loss firms (Hayn 
1995), and as a proxy for the abandonment option for firms likely to cease operations 
(Berger et al 1996; Subramanyam and Wild 1996; Barth et al 1998). Collins et al (1999) 
test book value as a correlated omitted variable to demonstrate that the basic earnings 
valuation model is mis-specified if book value is excluded. The key findings indicate 
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that as investors realize a firm cannot sustain losses indefinitely, negative earnings are 
less value-relevant than positive earnings. As a firm’s likelihood of failure increases, 
earnings no longer provide information for forming future expectations. Consequently, 
earnings become less value-relevant and book value becomes more value-relevant as it 
represents the option to liquidate. 
The relative value-relevance of earnings and book value has also been examined in the 
context of return on equity (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Penman 1998). Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997a) develop an option-style valuation model in which market value is a 
convex non-additive function of earnings and book value. A high return on equity 
(ROE) suggests that the firm is using its assets efficiently and will therefore continue to 
employ the assets in the same manner. Therefore, future earnings are expected to be 
similar to current earnings. This perception of permanence may result in value-relevant 
earnings. Conversely, if ROE is low, the firm will look for a better way to employ its 
assets. This would result in the need to revise the expectation of earnings and thus book 
value becomes more relevant as the predictability of earnings declines.  
A similar result was found by Penman (1998) who combined earnings and book value 
multipliers in a valuation model. Weights were calculated for capitalized earnings and 
book value dependent on the relative size of each measure. It was found that the weights 
varied non-linearly with respect to the difference between the measures.  
The research establishing the value-relevance of earnings and book value has 
predominantly used US data. The use of Australian data in this study provides an 
opportunity to investigate the generalizability of past results to another market. The 
similarities between the US and Australian markets, with the exception of size, suggest 
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that the magnitude and direction of value-relevance of earnings and book value should 
be comparable for Australian and US firms. It is expected that both earnings and book 
value are value-relevant as indicated by a positive association with price. 
Proposition 1: Earnings and book value are positively associated with firm value. 
2.4 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Both earnings and book value play a role in the valuation process as they provide 
alternate sources of information. However, if the market perceives a decline in the 
reliability of the earnings figure it may look to book value as the basis for its valuation. 
The development of an indicator of earnings reliability will provide guidance as to the 
reliance that should be placed on these measures in the valuation process.  
The literature presents three dominant approaches to the measurement of earnings 
management (McNichols 2000; Beneish 2001). Studies focusing on the detection of 
earnings management have traditionally used measures based on aggregate accruals 
(Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994; Dechow et al 
1995). Some industry-based studies have examined specific accruals that are likely to be 
used to manage earnings (McNichols and Wilson 1988; Liu et al 1997; Teoh et al 
1998a; Beaver and McNichols 1998; Petroni et al 1999). The final approach examines 
the distribution of reported earnings with earnings management indicated by 
discontinuities in the distribution (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997b; Degeorge et al 1999; 
Holland and Ramsay 2003). This study uses the discretionary component of total 
accruals as the indicator of earnings management. 
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2.4.1 Discretionary and Non-discretionary Accruals 
Accruals-based measures are widely accepted as indicators of earnings management 
activity (Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; Dechow et al 1995; Becker et al 
1998; Krishnan 2003). The decomposition of total accruals into discretionary and non-
discretionary components acknowledges that not all accrual choices represent earnings 
management. Accruals may also be used to make financial statements more informative. 
The difficulty is in determining into which category the accrual choices fall. 
Extensive research has been undertaken to identify the circumstances in which earnings 
management is more likely to occur (Jones 1991; Boynton et al 1992; De Fond and 
Jimbalvo 1994; Perry and Williams 1994; Wu 1997; Teoh et al 1998a, 1998b; Erickson 
and Wang 1999; Kasznik 1999; Wells 2002). For example, there is evidence that firms 
use income-increasing accruals prior to initial public offers (Teoh et al 1998b) and stock 
financed acquisitions (Erickson and Wang 1999), and in order to meet earnings targets 
(Kasznik 1999). There is also evidence of the use of income-decreasing accruals in 
order to reduce tax liabilities (Boynton et al 1992). 
Research has demonstrated that the market differentially values discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals (Guay et al 1996; Subramanyam 1996; Hribar and Collins 2002). 
Using the cross-sectional Jones model (DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994) to estimate non-
discretionary accruals, Subramanyam (1996) finds that discretionary accruals are value-
relevant, although contain less information for the market than non-discretionary 
accruals. This is consistent with discretionary accruals being less persistent than non-
discretionary accruals and may reflect the possibility of opportunism. Additional tests 
reveal evidence of income smoothing that enhances the persistence and thus the 
predictability of earnings. Subramanyam (1996) suggests that because this income 
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smoothing improves the value-relevance of earnings, the manipulation of accruals is 
intended as a credible signal and should not be perceived as opportunistic behavior. 
However, there is no evidence that the opposite is not true. Management’s smoothing of 
income may be opportunistic with the intention of enhancing value by misleading the 
market to believe that earnings are persistent.  
Guay et al (1996) find similar results with the market placing greater reliance on non-
discretionary accruals than discretionary accruals. Comparison of the commonly used 
discretionary accrual models reveals that the Jones model (Jones 1991) and modified-
Jones model (Dechow et al 1995) estimate discretionary accruals that are consistent 
with income smoothing. However, Guay et al (1996) were not able to distinguish 
between opportunistic and performance-related use of discretionary accruals.  
Whilst the literature has provided evidence of the value-relevance of discretionary 
accruals, the impact of earnings management on the value-relevance of earnings and 
book value has not been thoroughly investigated. Stock price declines and negative 
abnormal returns have been found for firms with severe cases of earnings management 
such as GAAP violations or SEC enforcements (Dechow et al 1996; Beneish 1997) but 
less extreme examples of earnings management have not been satisfactorily examined.  
Earnings management, as signaled by high levels of discretionary accruals, provides an 
indicator of poor earnings reliability. The perceived lack of earnings reliability may 
result in the market placing less reliance on earnings in the valuation process. The focus 
may then shift to book value as a source of information for valuation purposes. 
Proposition 2: Earnings management reduces the value-relevance of earnings and 
increases the value-relevance of book value. 
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2.4.2 Short-term and Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
Discretionary accruals can contain both short-term and long-term accruals. Short-term 
accruals are those accruals that affect working capital accounts and reflect changes to 
current assets and liabilities. Long-term accruals include depreciation, future tax 
benefits, employee entitlements, asset revaluation, and adjustments to the fair value of 
financial instruments. The information content of these components of accruals has been 
established in the literature (Wilson 1986; Dechow 1994; Cotter 1996; Loftus and Sin 
1997; Chia et al 1997; Guay and Sidhu 2001). Results predominantly suggest that short-
term accruals are more value-relevant than long-term accruals (Wilson 1986; Dechow 
1994; Chia et al 1997; Guay and Sidhu 2001).  
The relative usefulness of the components of accruals depends on the return interval 
being examined. As short-term accruals tend to reverse within one year, they are most 
relevant for a one-year return interval. Long-term accruals become more value-relevant 
as the return interval increases, as they tend to reverse over longer periods or not at all 
(Cotter 1996; Guay and Sidhu 2001). 
Chia et al (1997) examine the impact of aggregation bias through comparison of models 
using earnings and earnings components. The components examined were cash flows 
from operations, short-term accruals, and long-term accruals. By allowing the response 
coefficients to vary across the earnings components, the explanatory power of the model 
increased significantly, suggesting that each component has incremental information 
content over and above total earnings. The results also indicate that the value-relevance 
of short-term accruals is greater than that of long-term accruals. Thus, as the proportion 
of short-term accruals to long-term accruals increases, the value-relevance of total 
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accruals should increase. This suggests that short-term accruals may contribute more to 
the value-relevance of earnings than long-term accruals.  
Furthermore, Guay and Sidhu (2001) find that the information contained in long-term 
accruals is obscured when total earnings is used as the sole explanatory variable. This 
assists in explaining the contradictory results presented by Loftus and Sin (1997). Using 
Australian data, they found that long-term accruals dominate short-term accruals in the 
earnings-return relationship. Adopting an approach similar to Dechow (1994), they 
compared regression models relating each of three different performance measures with 
returns. The three measures used were earnings, operating cash flows, and operating 
cash flows adjusted for short-term accruals. Rather than estimating the response 
coefficients for each component of earnings, they examine the relative explanatory 
power for each model. This approach suffers from aggregation bias by restricting the 
components of earnings to the same response coefficient, thus masking the incremental 
effects of each component. 
Management can take advantage of the differential reversing characteristics of the 
components of accruals. As the market expects short-term accruals to reverse relatively 
quickly, there is little opportunity for manipulation by management. Sloan (1996) 
demonstrated that it can take up to three years for an accrual to reverse. However, the 
expected behavior of long-term accruals provides more prospects for opportunistic 
behavior as the manipulation of long-term accruals may remain undetected for several 
accounting periods if the market is not expecting a reversal to occur.  
Richardson et al (2001) examined the information content of accruals with respect to 
earnings quality and find that long-term accruals provide more information about future 
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SEC enforcements than short-term accruals. Furthermore, the use of long-term accruals 
to manipulate financial statements has been revealed in recent corporate collapses. For 
example, unreliable estimates of the fair value of merchant investments and energy 
assets were used by Enron managers to meet unrealistic revenue targets (Benston and 
Hartgraves 2002). In Australia, HIH Ltd manipulated its future income tax benefit and 
other deferred costs in order to inflate earnings (CCH Australia 2001).  
As short-term and long-term accruals have the potential to mitigate different timing and 
matching problems, distinguishing between these components is an important 
consideration in any investigation of the role of discretionary accruals as an earnings 
management tool. However, in the earnings management literature, the existing 
measures of discretionary accruals fail to address this consideration. 
Earlier studies tested for earnings management using models based on total accruals. 
Healy (1985) used the mean total accruals from the estimation period to represent non-
discretionary accruals. Similarly, DeAngelo (1986) used the previous period’s total 
accruals as the estimate of non-discretionary accruals. The industry model proposed by 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) also use total accruals, estimating the non-discretionary 
accruals based on the industry median. No consideration is given to the short-term and 
long-term components of discretionary accruals in these models.  
The Jones model (Jones 1991) and its modifications (DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994; 
Dechow et al 1995) attempt to identify the drivers of non-discretionary accruals based 
on a firm’s economic circumstances. The two key variables included in these models are 
the change in revenue and the level of property, plant and equipment. The change in 
revenue may capture much of the short-term component of discretionary accruals whilst 
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property, plant and equipment may capture the long-term depreciation accrual. 
However, a number of potential drivers of long-term accruals are overlooked by these 
models. Therefore, there is a need to develop a model that decomposes total accruals in 
order to examine the differential effect of short-term and long-term discretionary 
accruals to manage earnings. 
The market may perceive the use of long-term discretionary accruals as an earnings 
management tool differently from the use of short-term discretionary accruals.  The use 
of long-term discretionary accruals may reduce the perception of earnings reliability 
more so than the use of short-term discretionary accruals as they provide greater 
opportunity for manipulation. Therefore, the impact on the value-relevance of earnings 
and book value will be greater when long-term discretionary accruals are used to 
manage earnings than for short-term discretionary accruals. 
Proposition 3: Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals has a greater 
impact on the value-relevance of earnings and book value than earnings management 
via short-term discretionary accruals. 
2.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL 
The model aims to test the proposition that the value-relevance of accounting 
information is influenced by the perceived reliability of that information. The proposed 
indicators of earnings management may have some limitations. Whilst the use of 
discretionary accruals can be theoretically justified, the construct cannot be accurately 
measured empirically. Firstly, the measurement error associated with the estimation of 
total accruals is cause for concern. Similarly, the literature indicates a high level of 
measurement error in the various discretionary accrual models commonly used to detect 
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earnings management. Therefore, the ability of these models to detect earnings 
management is questionable. Consequently, tests of the propositions will be joint tests 
of the impact of earnings management and the construct validity of the discretionary 
accrual models. 
The model will be tested using archival data that contain the effects of all influences, 
not just the release of accounting information. Therefore, it may prove difficult to 
isolate the impact of earnings management on the value-relevance of earnings and book 
value.  
2.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter links earnings management to firm valuation. The value-relevance of 
accounting information is affected by the perceived reliability of the information. This 
study focuses on earnings and book value as the accounting information used in firm 
valuation and examines earnings management as an indicator of earnings reliability. 
Consistent with past research it uses discretionary accruals as the measure of earnings 
management. 
If both earnings and book value are value-relevant, it is proposed that when earnings are 
not reliable, the market may look to book value as an alternate source of information on 
which to base its valuation. This research examines the impact of earnings management 
on the value-relevance of earnings and book value. For firm’s whose discretionary 
accruals indicate earnings management, the value-relevance of earnings is expected to 
be lower than for firms without earnings management. Moreover, in the presence of 
earnings management, it is expected that there will be a shift from a reliance on earnings 
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to a reliance on book value in the valuation process. This will be reflected in a decrease 
in the value-relevance of earnings and an increase in the value-relevance of book value. 
Earnings management may be achieved through the use of total, short-term, or long- 
discretionary accruals. This study will develop a method to decompose total accruals in 
order to investigate the differential valuation effect of earnings management via short-
term and long-term discretionary accruals. 
The following propositions were developed from the discussion in this chapter: 
Proposition 1: Earnings and book value are positively associated with firm 
value. 
Proposition 2: Earnings management reduces the value-relevance of earnings 
and increases the value-relevance of book value. 
Proposition 3: The effect of long-term discretionary accruals on the value 
relevance of earnings and book value is greater than the effect 
of short-term discretionary accruals on the value relevance of 
earnings and book value. 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One discussed the potential impact of earnings management on the value-
relevance of accounting information. Chapter Two presented a valuation model based 
on earnings and book value, with earnings management incorporated as an indicator of 
earnings reliability. Propositions regarding the impact of earnings management on the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value were developed from the literature. 
The methods used to empirically test the propositions are detailed in this chapter. 
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the research design and states the hypotheses to be 
tested. The sample and data collection procedures are discussed in Section 3.3. The 
operationalization of the dependent, independent and moderating constructs is detailed 
in Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 respectively. Section 3.7 identifies the control variables for 
inclusion in the model and Section 3.8 outlines the analysis procedures. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the variables, models and hypotheses presented in Section 
3.9. 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
Value-relevance research investigates the association between accounting information 
and some measure of value. The objective is to provide an assessment of the usefulness 
to investors of accounting information in valuing the firm. Consistent with existing 
research on the value-relevance of accounting information, this study uses regression 
analysis to test the hypotheses. Value-relevance is represented by significant estimated 
regression coefficients for the accounting variables. Pooled regressions and yearly 
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cross-sectional regressions are estimated for the 5-year period from 1997 to 2001 
inclusive.  
3.2.1 Value-relevance Model 
This study uses the valuation framework developed by Ohlson (1995) to examine the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value of equity. An empirical adaptation of 
Ohlson’s theoretical model has been used extensively in the value-relevance literature 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Collins et al 1997; Barth et al 1998; Collins et al 1999; 
Ou and Sepe 2002). In the empirical model, market price is a linear function of earnings 
and book value of equity. 
Pjt = α0 + α1 Ejt +α2 BVjt + τjt       [1] 
Where 
Pjt = stock price for firm j at the end of the third month of year t+1 
Ejt = earnings before extraordinary items per share for firm j in year t 
BVjt = book value of equity per share for firm j at end year t 
τjt = error term for firm j in year t 
Hypothesis 1: Earnings and book value are value-relevant.   
The coefficients, α1 and α2, represent the value-relevance of earnings and book value 
respectively. The value-relevance of earnings and book value is well established in the 
literature using US data. Similar results are anticipated using Australian data in this 
study. It is expected that both earnings and book value display a positive association 
with firm value. Thus, both α1 and α2 are expected to be positive and significant. 
Hypothesis 1 can be stated in terms of the regression coefficients from Equation [1] as 
follows: 
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H10: α1 = 0, α2 = 0 
H11: α1 > 0, α2 > 0 
 
3.2.2 Earnings Management Model 
The Earnings-Management Model captures the additional information provided by the 
indicator of earnings management through the inclusion of slope dummies for earnings 
and book value. Each dummy variable has a value of one when the level of 
discretionary accruals indicates earnings management, as defined in Section 3.6.4. The 
dummy variables assist in evaluating the impact of earnings management on the value-
relevance of earnings and book value. The earnings management indicator is established 
using each of total discretionary accruals, short-term discretionary accruals, and long-
term discretionary accruals.  
As the value-relevance of earnings and book value may be affected by the reliability of 
earnings, the coefficient for each of these accounting measures is a function of earnings 
management as indicated by the dummy variable. An intercept dummy is also included 
in the model to assess the value-relevance of earnings management in its own right. 
Pjt = α0 + α1 Ejt +α2 BVjt + τjt       [1] 
With 
α0 = a0 + a1Djt          and          α1 = a2 + a3Djt          and          α2 = a4 + a5Djt  
Where 
Djt = 1 if Earnings Management; 0 otherwise 
Thus 
Pjt = (a0 + a1Djt ) + (a2 + a3Djt ) Ejt + (a4 + a5Djt ) BVjt + τjt 
Pjt = a0 + a1Djt + a2 Ejt + a3 Ejt Djt + a4 BVjt + a5 BVjt Djt + τjt 
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Pjt = β0 + β1 Djt + β2 Ejt + β3 Ejt Djt +β4 BVjt + β5 BVjt Djt + ϖjt  [2] 
Hypothesis 2A: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-relevance of 
book value is increased when firms manage earnings via total discretionary accruals. 
Hypothesis 2B: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-relevance of 
book value is increased when firms manage earnings via short-term discretionary 
accruals. 
Hypothesis 2C: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-relevance of 
book value is increased when firms manage earnings via long-term discretionary 
accruals. 
The β2 slope coefficient represents the value-relevance of earnings in the absence of 
earnings management. The market’s response to earnings when earnings are managed is 
represented by the sum of the coefficients β2 and β3.  Likewise, the β4 slope coefficient 
represents the value-relevance of book value in the absence of earnings management. 
The market’s response to book value when the earnings are managed is represented by 
the sum of the coefficients β4 and β5.   
The slope coefficients β3 and β5 represent the impact of earnings management on the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value respectively. Following Proposition 2, it is 
expected that β3 is negative, indicating a decline in the value-relevance of earnings. 
Conversely, it is expected that β5 is positive, indicating an increase in the value-
relevance of book value as the market shifts its reliance away from earnings.   
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Hypothesis 2 can be stated in terms of the regression coefficients from Equation [2] as 
follows: 
H20: β3  = 0, β5  = 0 
H21: β3  < 0, β5  > 0 
3.2.3 Extended-Earnings-Management Model 
The Extended-Earnings-Management Model allows for tests of the combined valuation 
effect of earnings management via both short-term and long-term discretionary accruals. 
This is achieved through the inclusion of separate dummy variables for short-term 
discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary accruals. A positive dummy variable 
indicates the existence of earnings management. 
The dummy variables are surrogates for the reliability of accounting information. The 
coefficients for earnings and book value are a function of both of these indicators of 
reliability. Intercept dummy variables are included in the model to represent earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals and earnings management via long-
term discretionary accruals in order to assess the value-relevance of these sources of 
earnings management. The formal representation of the relationship starts with the 
following equation: 
Pjt = α0 + α1 Ejt +α2 BVjt + τjt       [1] 
With 
α0 = a0 + a1Sjt + a2Ljt     and     α1 = a3 + a4Sjt + a5Ljt     and     α2 = a6 + a7Sjt + a8Ljt 
Where 
Sjt = 1 if Earnings Management via short-term discretionary accruals; 0 otherwise 
Ljt = 1 if Earnings Management via long-term discretionary accruals; 0 otherwise 
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Thus 
Pjt = (a0 + a1Sjt + a2Ljt) + (a3 + a4Sjt + a5Ljt) Ejt + (a6 + a7Sjt + a8Ljt) BVjt + τjt 
Pjt = a0 + a1Sjt + a2Ljt + a3Ejt + a4EjtSjt + a5EjtLjt + a6BVjt + a7BVjtSjt + a8BVjtLjt + τjt 
Pjt = φ0 + φ1Sjt + φ2Ljt + φ3Ejt + φ4EjtSjt + φ5EjtLjt + φ6BVjt + φ7BVjtSjt + φ8BVjtLjt + ξjt
           [3] 
Hypothesis 3: Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals has a greater 
impact on the value-relevance of earnings and book value than earnings management 
via short-term discretionary accruals. 
The φ3 slope coefficient represents the value-relevance of earnings in the absence of 
earnings management. The impact on the value-relevance of earnings of earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary accruals 
is represented by φ4 and φ5 respectively. Similarly, the φ6 slope coefficient represents the 
value-relevance of book value in the absence of earnings management. The impact on 
the value-relevance of book value of earnings management via short-term discretionary 
accruals and long-term discretionary accruals is represented by φ7 and φ8 respectively. 
From Hypotheses 2B and 2C, φ4 and φ5 are expected to be negative. Following 
Proposition 3, if earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals are expected 
to have more of an impact than earnings management via short-term discretionary 
accruals, then φ5 is expected to be less than φ4. Similarly, from Hypotheses 2B and 2C, 
φ7 and φ8 are expected to be positive. Therefore, if earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals are expected to have more of an impact than earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals, then φ8 will be greater than φ7. 
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Hypothesis 3 can be stated in terms of the regression coefficients from Equation [3] as 
follows: 
H30: φ4 = φ5 , φ7 = φ8 
H31: φ4 > φ5 , φ7 < φ8 
The Extended-Earnings-Management Model can also be used for a secondary test of 
Hypotheses 2B and 2C. Following Proposition 2, when earnings are managed via short-
term discretionary accruals, it is expected that φ4 is negative, indicating a decline in the 
value-relevance of earnings. Conversely, it is expected that φ7 is positive, indicating an 
increase in the value-relevance of book value as the market shifts its reliance away from 
earnings in the presence of earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals. 
Hypothesis 2B can be stated in terms of the regression coefficients from Equation [3] as 
follows: 
H2B0: φ4 = 0, φ7 = 0 
H2B1: φ4 < 0, φ7 > 0 
Similarly, it is expected that φ5 is negative and φ8 is positive in the presence of earnings 
management via long-term discretionary. Hypothesis 2C can be stated in terms of the 
regression coefficients from Equation [3] as follows: 
H2C0: φ5 = 0, φ8 = 0 
H2C1: φ5 < 0, φ8 > 0 
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3.3 SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
This study covers the reporting periods from 1997 to 2001 inclusive. The initial sample 
includes firms with a 30 June balance date listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
Firms in the banking, insurance and finance industry are eliminated from the sample due 
to unique industry regulations imposed by the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA). Also, the estimation of discretionary accruals is likely to be difficult 
for these industries due to the nature of industry-specific accounting practices. Stock 
price data and financial statement data are obtained from the SIRCA ASX and ASPECT 
databases respectively. 
3.4 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE DEPENDENT 
CONSTRUCT 
Assessing the value-relevance of financial statement information requires an 
examination of the extent to which investors use this information in valuing the firm. 
Market price per share is the dependent variable in the model and is the benchmark 
against which the accounting information is compared. 
This study aims to identify accounting measures that drive equity value. The timeliness 
of the information is not the primary issue, unlike that of an event study, which focuses 
on the price reaction. The choice of price or returns as the dependent variable depends 
on the question being examined. Price is appropriate when the aim is to determine the 
value-relevance of accounting measures, whereas returns are more appropriate when the 
objective is to explain changes in value over a specified time. As the focus of this study 
is value-relevance, it is more appropriate to use price levels rather than returns. 
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Although stock price is the appropriate measure theoretically, there are potential 
econometric problems with using this measure. The issue of scale when using a price 
specification is well documented (Christie 1987; Kothari and Zimmerman 1995; Barth 
and Kallapur 1996; Barth and Clinch 2001). Cross-sectional scale difference among 
firms can result in biased coefficient estimates and heteroscedasticity of the regression 
errors.  
The issue of biased coefficient estimates can be addressed through the use of a proxy 
variable for scale. Common scale proxies include the number of shares outstanding, 
book value of equity, sales, total assets, and lagged price. These variables can be used to 
deflate the regression variables or be included as an independent variable in the 
regression (Barth and Kallapur 1996). However, it has been found that biased 
coefficient estimates can best be overcome through the inclusion of a scale proxy as an 
independent variable rather than as a deflator (Barth and Kallapur 1996).  
In this study, the model is estimated on a per share basis and includes book value of 
equity as an independent variable. The number of shares outstanding has been criticized 
as a scale proxy primarily due to the fact that this number is relatively easy for 
management to alter and so does not necessarily reflect firm size (Easton and Sommers 
2000). Book value of equity will act as a scale proxy thus addressing the problem of 
biased coefficients. The issue of heteroscedasticity is best addressed through the use of 
White (1980) standard errors to calculate the t-statistics used to test the significance of 
the coefficient estimates (Barth and Kallapur 1996).  
The stock price used in the regression is the price per share at the end of September, 3 
months after the June 30th balance date. This approach is used in order to ensure that the 
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stock price fully reflects the information presented in the annual reports (Hayn 1995; 
Cheng et al 1996; Ou and Sepe 2002).  
3.5 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE INDEPENDENT 
CONSTRUCTS 
The two accounting measures examined in this study are earnings and book value. It is 
common practice in the valuation literature to define earnings as earnings before 
extraordinary items per share (Dechow 1994; Hayn 1995; Cheng et al 1996; 
Subramanyam 1996; Barth et al 1998; Barth et al 2001; Ou and Sepe 2002). This study 
will use earnings before extraordinary items per share as the primary measure. Earnings 
before abnormal items and earnings after extraordinary items will also be examined as 
part of the sensitivity analysis. This approach assists in the identification of 
discretionary accruals that may be found in the abnormal or extraordinary component of 
earnings. Consistent with past research, book value is defined as book value of equity 
per share (Barth et al 1998; Ou and Sepe 2002). The number of shares outstanding as at 
30 June is used as the deflator. 
3.6 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MODERATING 
CONSTRUCT 
In order to test the hypotheses presented in Section 3.2, an indicator variable for 
earnings management must be developed. Section 2.4 presented the three alternative 
approaches to measuring the incidence of earnings management that are currently used 
in the literature.  
The first approach separates aggregate accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary 
accruals, with the level of discretionary accruals indicating earnings management (Jones 
  
37
1991; DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994; Dechow et al 1995). The assumption underlying this 
approach is that the level of accruals is driven by the economic conditions of the firm 
and by managerial discretion. This approach requires the application of regression 
models in which total accruals is the dependent variable and a range of accounting 
variables are used as the explanatory variables. The expected level of accruals is 
deemed to be non-discretionary and the unexpected component to be discretionary and 
thus susceptible to manipulation. 
A second approach is the examination of the expected behavior of specific accruals. 
Research has investigated specific accruals including depreciation estimates and bad 
debt provisions (Teoh et al 1998b), bank loan loss provisions (Collins et al 1995; Liu et 
al 1997), insurance claim loss reserves (Beaver and McNichols 1998; Petroni et al 
1999), and deferred tax valuation allowances (Visvanathan 1998; Miller and Skinner 
1998). An advantage of this approach is that it enables investigation of the accruals that 
are most likely to be manipulated by management. However, the industry specific 
nature of this approach puts limitations on the sample size and limits the generalizability 
of results (Beneish 2001).  
The third approach requires the examination of the distribution of earnings to detect 
discontinuities in the distribution. It is assumed that such discontinuities are an 
indication that firms manage earnings to meet specific benchmarks such as zero 
earnings, previous year’s earnings, or an analyst forecast. The research provides 
evidence of the existence of this type of earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997b; Degeorge et al 1999; Holland and Ramsay 2003). Whilst this approach identifies 
the likelihood of earnings management in specific firms, it is not possible to assess the 
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extent of earnings management or the nature of the earnings management (Beneish 
2001). As this study aims to investigate the differential effect of earnings management 
via short-term versus long-term discretionary accruals, the distribution approach is not 
appropriate. 
The aggregate accruals approach is adopted in this study with the level of discretionary 
accruals used as the indicator of earnings management. Moreover, short-term and long-
term discretionary accruals are estimated to examine the differential impact of these 
sources of earnings management on the value-relevance of earnings and book value. 
Before discretionary accruals can be estimated, total accruals need to be identified. 
Accruals can be derived either from the income statement or from the balance sheet. 
The basic definition of total accruals is the difference between earnings and cash flow 
from operations. Nevertheless, most studies of accruals use balance sheet information to 
indirectly estimate accruals as the change in working capital excluding the change in 
cash (Bowen et al 1987; Jones 1991; Dechow 1994; Sloan 1996; Pfeiffer et al 1998; 
Bartov et al 2001; Guay and Sidhu 2001).  
In this study, total accruals are determined directly as the difference between earnings 
before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations.  
t,jt,jt,j CFOEARNACC −=        [4] 
where   
ACCj,t = Total Accruals for firm j in year t 
EARNj,t = Earnings before extraordinary Items for firm j in year t 
CFOj,t = Cash Flows from Operations for firm j in year t 
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This method results in less measurement error than the balance sheet approach for 
estimating accruals, due to certain non-operating items that impact on the current 
accounts without flowing through the income statement (Hribar and Collins 2002). Such 
items include reclassifications, acquisitions, divestitures, and foreign currency 
transactions. Consequently, as many of these items also include long-term accruals, the 
value-relevance of long-term accruals is underestimated when the indirect method is 
used to determine cash flows (Guay and Sidhu 2001). As part of the sensitivity analysis 
presented in Section 4.6.3, total accruals will also be estimated using earnings before 
abnormal items and earnings after extraordinary items. 
Previous studies of the value-relevance of accrual components have provided the 
following definition of short-term accruals (Dechow 1994; Loftus and Sin 1997; 
Pfeiffer and Elgers 1999; Guay and Sidhu 2001). 
tj,tj,tj,tj,tj,tj,tj, ∆OCL∆TXP∆AP∆OCA∆INV∆ARSTACC −−−++=  [5] 
where   
STACCj,t = Short-term Accruals for firm j in year t 
∆ARj,t = Accounts Receivable at end year t less Accounts Receivable at end 
year t-1 for firm j 
∆INVj,t = Inventory at end year t less Inventory at end year t-1 for firm j 
∆OCAj,t = Other Current Assets at end year t less Other Current Assets at end 
year t-1 for firm j 
∆APj,t = Accounts Payable at end year t less Accounts Payable at end year t-1 
for firm j 
∆TXPj,t = Tax Payable at end year t less Tax Payable at end year t-1 for firm j 
∆OCLj,t = Other Current Liabilities at end year t less Other Current Liabilities 
at end year t-1 for firm j 
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As total accruals are the sum of the short-term and long-term components, long-term 
accruals can be determined by the difference between total accruals and short-term 
accruals (Teoh et al 1998b).  
tj,tj,tj, STACCACCLTACC −=        [6] 
where   
LTACCj,t = Long-term Accruals for firm j in year t 
ACCj,t = Total Accruals for firm j in year t (calculated using equation [4]) 
STACCj,t = Short-term Accruals for firm j in year t (calculated using equation ([5]) 
The literature proposes a number of models to estimate a firm’s discretionary accruals. 
The earliest earnings management studies use total accruals to proxy for expected non-
discretionary accruals and assume that non-discretionary accruals are constant (Healy 
1985; DeAngelo 1986). Jones (1991) introduced the idea that non-discretionary accruals 
may vary in relation to a firm’s economic situation and as such, there is a need to 
distinguish the discretionary from the non-discretionary components of total accruals. 
The decomposition of accruals is most commonly achieved through the application of 
the Jones model (Jones 1991) or the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al 1995) either 
in time series or cross-sectional form (DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994).  
Comparisons of these models attempted to determine the most accurate model for 
estimating discretionary accruals (Dechow et al 1995; Subramanyam 1996; Young 
1999; Peasnell et al 2000; Thomas and Zhang 2000). These comparisons show that 
parameter estimates are better specified for cross-sectional than for time-series versions 
of the Jones and modified-Jones models (Subramanyam 1996). Estimation of a model 
using time-series data is limited by the number of years of data availability, whereas the 
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cross-sectional approach allows for a greater number of observations to be used. The 
cross-sectional approach also mitigates potential survivorship bias problems (DeFond 
and Jimbalvo 1994). Pooling by industry also improves the accuracy of the estimates 
(Boynton et al 1992; Dechow et al 1995) based on the assumption that industry is a 
good proxy for the inherent non-discretionary component of accruals. However, cross-
sectional estimation of discretionary accruals also has its limitations. For example, 
cross-sectional models are unlikely to capture industry-wide earnings management or 
the effects of the mean reversion properties of accruals (Peasnell et al 2000). Despite 
this drawback, the cross-sectional method is used in this study. 
A limitation of the existing models for estimating discretionary accruals is that these 
models do not effectively partition out the short-term and long-term components. Some 
models appear to focus on the short-term through examination of working capital 
accruals (Jones 1991; DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994; Dechow et al 1995). However, long-
term discretionary accruals have generally been disregarded. In the Jones model (Jones 
1991), the change in revenue variable may capture most of the short-term accruals, but 
the property, plant and equipment variable captures only one dimension of long-term 
accruals. Consequently, there is a need to develop models to better identify the 
discretionary component of short-term and long-term accruals. This study uses the Jones 
model (Jones 1991) as a basis for developing two distinct models to estimate short-term 
and long-term discretionary accruals.  
3.6.1 Total Discretionary Accruals 
An estimate of expected accruals for a firm is developed using the industry-based cross-
sectional Jones model (Jones 1991). The modified-Jones model has been rejected for 
  
42
this study as it is more applicable for firms that are ex ante likely to manage earnings 
(Thomas and Zhang 2000). 
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where   
ACCj,t = accruals for firm j in year t (calculated using equation [4]) 
TAj,t-1 = total assets for firm j at end year t-1 
∆REVj,t = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm j 
PPEj,t = property, plant and equipment for firm j at end year t  
εj,t = error term for firm j in year t 
The cross-sectional regression equation is estimated for each industry sector based on 
the ASX classification as detailed in Appendix 1. Industry sectors are used in preference 
to sub-sectors in order to obtain a sufficient number of observations for the industry 
regressions. Unfortunately, there may be considerable diversity of firms within an 
industry sector which may limit the effectiveness of this approach in identifying 
industry-wide discretionary accruals. Sectors with less than ten firms in any one year are 
excluded from the analysis. 
The estimated coefficients from Equation [7] are used to calculate the expected accruals 
for each firm. As the forecast is assumed to represent non-discretionary component of 
accruals, the difference between this estimation and actual accruals is deemed to be the 
total discretionary accruals. 
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where   
DACCj,t = discretionary accruals for firm j in year t 
ACCj,t = accruals for firm j in year t (calculated using Equation [5]) 
TAj,t-1 = total assets for firm j at end year t-1 
∆REVj,t = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm j 
PPEj,t = property, plant and equipment for firm j at end year t  
j1, j2, j3 = industry specific estimated coefficients from Equation [7] 
3.6.2 Short-term Discretionary Accruals 
An estimate of expected short-term accruals for a firm is developed using the revenue 
component of the Jones model (Jones 1991).  
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Where   
STACCj,t = short-term accruals for firm j in year t (calculated using Equation [5]) 
TAj,t-1 = total assets for firm j at end year t-1 
∆REVj,t = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm j 
εj,t = error term for firm j in year t 
The cross-sectional regression equation is estimated for each industry. The estimated 
coefficients from Equation [9] are then used to calculate the expected short-term 
accruals for each firm. As the forecast is assumed to represent non-discretionary 
component of short-term accruals, the difference between this estimation and actual 
short-term accruals is deemed to be the discretionary component of short-term accruals. 
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Where   
STDACCj,t = short-term discretionary accruals for firm j in year t 
STACCj,t = short-term accruals for firm j in year t (calculated using Equation [5]) 
TAj,t-1 = total assets for firm j at end year t-1 
∆REVj,t = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm j 
g1, g2 = industry specific estimated coefficients from Equation [9] 
3.6.3 Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
An estimate of expected long-term accruals for a firm is developed using the key drivers 
of long-term accruals. The relevant variables include property, plant and equipment, 
intangibles, and non-current provisions.  
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Where   
LTACCj,t = short-term accruals for firm j in year t (calculated using Equation [6]) 
TAj,t-1 = total assets for firm j at end year t-1 
PPEj,t = property, plant and equipment for firm j at end year t  
INTj,t = intangibles for firm j at end year t  
NCPj,t = non-current provisions for firm j at end year t  
εj,t = error term for firm j in year t 
Property, plant and equipment and intangibles are included to capture the accruals 
associated with depreciation and amortization. It is assumed that these accounts are not 
managed thereby leading to an estimation of non-discretionary accruals. Total non-
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current provisions for the firm are included to capture any industry-specific long-term 
accruals such as warranty provisions and provisions for mine maintenance as well as 
employee entitlements.  
The cross-sectional regression equation is estimated for each industry sector. For 
industries with less than ten firms, the observations are removed from the sample. The 
estimated coefficients from Equation [11] are used to calculate the expected long-term 
accruals for each firm. As the forecast is assumed to represent the non-discretionary 
component of long-term accruals, the difference between this estimation and actual 
long-term accruals is deemed to be the discretionary component of long-term accruals.   
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Where   
LTDACCj,t = long-term discretionary accruals for firm j in year t 
LTACCj,t = long-term accruals for firm j in year t (calculated using Equation [6]) 
TAj,t-1 = total assets for firm j at end year t-1 
PPEj,t = property, plant and equipment at end year t for firm j 
INTj,t = intangibles at end year t for firm j 
NCPj,t = non-current provisions at end year t for firm j 
h1, h2, h3, h4 = industry specific estimated coefficients from Equation [11] 
3.6.4 Indicator of Earnings Management 
Discretionary accruals are either positive or negative as the intent may be to manage 
current earnings in either direction to reach a target. Consequently, it is the magnitude 
rather than the direction of the accruals that is of interest. The absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals is used to rank firms according to the level of accrual usage. High 
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levels of discretionary accruals are more likely to reflect opportunistic behavior than 
conservative levels of discretionary accruals and thus signal low reliability of earnings. 
Therefore, high discretionary accruals are used as the indicator of earnings management 
in this study. On this basis, firms are allocated to one of two groups representing (1) 
Earnings Management and (2) No Earnings Management. 
The allocation is achieved using two alternative benchmarks. The first approach uses 
the industry median as the benchmark. Firms with absolute discretionary accruals above 
the industry median are assigned to the “Earnings Management” group, with those 
below assigned to the “No Earnings Management” group. The alternative approach is to 
use industry quartiles as the benchmark to provide a stronger test between the two 
groups. The top quartile is assigned to the “Earnings Management” group and the 
bottom quartile to the “No Earnings Management” group. The allocation is made using 
each of total discretionary accruals, short-term discretionary accruals and long-term 
discretionary accruals. Allocation on the basis of quartiles is used for the main analysis. 
Comparison of the results when the median is used as the allocation basis is provided in 
the sensitivity analysis. 
The Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]) is estimated using total discretionary 
accruals, short-term discretionary accruals, and long-term discretionary accruals as the 
indicators of earnings management. The Extended-Earnings-Management Model 
(Equation [3]) requires estimation using both the short-term and long-term indicators of 
earnings management.  
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3.7 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Research has identified variables that influence the relative value-relevance of earnings 
and book value. The control variables used in this study are Return on Equity 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Penman 1998), Leverage (Barth et al 1998; Collins et al 
1999), and Negative Earnings (Hayn 1995; Collins et al 1999). These factors are 
controlled for through inclusion of additional independent variables in the Value-
relevance Model (Equation [1]), the Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]) and 
the Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]). 
Pjt = α0 + α1Ejt + α2BVjt + α3ROEjt + α4LEVjt + α5NEjt  + υjt       [1a] 
Pjt = β0 + β1Ejt + β2EjtDjt + β3BVjt + β4BVjtDjt + β5ROEjt + β6LEVjt  + β7NEjt  + ζjt   [2a] 
Pjt = φ0 + φ1Ejt + φ2EjtSjt + φ3EjtLjt + φ4BVjt + φ5BVjtSjt + φ6BVjtLjt  
+ φ7ROEjt + φ8LEVjt + φ9NEjt  + νjt      [3a] 
Where 
ROEjt = return on equity = Ejt / BVjt 
Ejt = earnings before extraordinary items per share for firm j in year t 
BVjt = book value of equity per share for firm j at end year t 
LEVjt = leverage = TAjt / TLjt 
TAjt = total assets for firm j at end year t 
TLjt = total liabilities for firm j at end year t 
NEjt = negative earnings = 1 if firm j has negative earnings in year t, 0 otherwise 
3.8 ANALYSIS PROCEDURES  
3.8.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Preliminary analysis of the data includes the calculation of descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the market and accounting variables. This analysis is performed on the 
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sample as a whole as well as for sub-samples according to the presence and type of 
earnings management undertaken by firms. Comparisons are made between the earnings 
management and non earnings management firms for earnings management via total 
discretionary accruals, short-term discretionary accruals, and long-term discretionary 
accruals. 
3.8.2 Determination of Earnings Management Dummy Variables 
The discretionary accrual measures of earnings management are determined using 
Equations [4] to [12] following the procedures outlined in Section 3.6. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate Equations [7], [9] and [11]. Firms are 
designated as either “earnings management” or “no earnings management”, based on 
their level of discretionary accruals relative to other firms in the same industry sector.  
3.8.3 Tests of the Hypotheses 
Pooled OLS regression is used to estimate the three models used in this study; the 
Value-relevance Model (Equation [1]), the Earnings-Management Model (Equation 
[2]), and the Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]). Hypothesis 1 is 
tested using the estimated coefficients from the Value-relevance Model. The Earnings-
Management Model is estimated for each of the three alternate sources of earnings 
management; total discretionary accruals, short-term discretionary accruals, and long-
term discretionary accruals. The estimated coefficients are used to test Hypotheses 2A, 
2B and 2C. A Wald test is applied to the estimated coefficients from the Extended-
Earnings-Management Model to test Hypothesis 3. Hypotheses 2B and 2C are also 
tested using the estimated coefficients from the Extended-Earnings-Management 
Model. 
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The assumptions underlying pooled OLS regression suggest no relationship within or 
between each cross-section or year. If some relationship does exist and is not specified 
in the model, then the misspecification is captured in the error and may contaminate the 
coefficient estimates. This can be overcome by using either the fixed effects or random 
effects models. 
The Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method used to estimate the random effects 
model is more efficient than the Least Squares with Dummy Variables (LSDV) method 
used to estimate the fixed effect model. However, the consistency of the estimation is 
questionable if the assumptions are not satisfied. Of particular concern is the assumption 
that the firm-specific component captured in the error term is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables. In other words, there is a trade-off between the consistency of the 
fixed effect model and the efficiency of the random effects model.  
In a fixed effects model a different intercept is estimated for each pool member through 
the inclusion of firm identifying dummy variables. For the samples used in this study, 
this would result in a large number of parameters relative to the number of observations. 
Thus, the power of the model would be diminished due to the loss of degrees of 
freedom. The random effects model assumes that the relationship among the cross-
sections is random and captured in the error term. Unfortunately, this method is 
susceptible to the same problems as the fixed effects model if the number of 
observations is small relative to the number of different pool members. Thus, neither the 
fixed effects model nor the random effects model is appropriate for this study due to the 
nature of the sample. 
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The pooling of firm observations may lead to bias in the t-statistics due to a lack of 
independence of the observations. This issue is addressed in two ways. The results are 
reported on an annual basis as well as for the pooled data. Although this reduces the 
power of the test due to the reduced sample size, it does overcome the estimation bias. 
Furthermore, to control for possible heteroscedasticity in the residuals, the significance 
of the coefficients is tested using White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
3.8.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The initial sensitivity analysis aims to control for known influences on the relative 
value-relevance of earnings and book value. Return on equity, leverage, and negative 
earnings are included as additional explanatory variables in the Value-relevance Model 
(Equation [1a]), Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2a]), and the Extended-
Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3a]) as presented in Section 3.7. 
The primary analysis is undertaken using the industry quartiles as the earnings 
management allocation method as discussed in Section 3.6.4. To test the robustness of 
the results, the models are estimated using the earnings management dummy and 
interaction variables based on the industry median as the benchmark. 
Further sensitivity analysis will consider an alternative definition of earnings. The 
earnings variable in the each model is replaced with earnings before abnormal items and 
earnings after extraordinary items. The models are then re-estimated using OLS 
regression and the hypotheses tested using the new coefficients. The comparison will 
also require the recalculation of the indicator of earnings management via total 
discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary accruals as these accruals differ 
depending on the measure of earnings. Short-term accruals are unaffected by the 
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measure of earnings as can be seen in the definition provided by Equation [5] in Section 
3.6.  
3.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter described the empirical analysis required to test the propositions presented 
in Chapter Two. Discussion of the operationalization of the constructs provides 
definitions of the variables used in the models. A summary of these definitions is 
presented in Table 3.1. The hypotheses were developed from the propositions in 
conjunction with the discussion of the analysis procedures. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present a 
summary of the models and hypotheses respectively. 
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Table 3-1  Definition of Variables 
SYMBOL VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Pjt Market Price Stock price for firm j at end of the third month of year 
t+1 
Ejt Earnings Earnings before extraordinary items per share for firm j 
in year t 
BVjt Book Value Book value of equity per share for firm j at end year t 
Djt Earnings Management Dummy D = 1 if Earnings Management, 0 otherwise 
Sjt Short-term Discretionary Accruals 
Earnings Management Dummy 
S = 1 if Earnings Management via short-term 
discretionary accruals; 0 otherwise 
Ljt Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
Earnings Management Dummy 
L = 1 if Earnings Management via long-term 
discretionary accruals; 0 otherwise 
ACCj,t Total Accruals Total accruals for firm j in year t 
EARNj,t Earnings Earnings before extraordinary items for firm j in year t 
CFOj,t Cash Flows from Operations Cash flows from operations for firm j in year t 
TAj,t-1 Total Assets Total assets for firm j at end year t-1 
∆REVj,t Change in Revenue Revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm j 
PPEj,t Property, Plant and Equipment Property, plant and equipment at end year t for firm j 
INTj,t Intangibles Intangibles at end year t for firm j 
NCPj,t Non-current provisions Non-current provisions at end year t for firm j 
DACCj,t Discretionary Accruals Discretionary accruals for firm j in year t 
STACCj,t Short-term Accruals Short-term accruals for firm j in year t 
LTACCj,t Long-term Accruals Long-term accruals for firm j in year t 
STDACCj,t Short-term Discretionary Accruals Short-term discretionary accruals for firm j in year t 
LTDACCj,t Long-term Discretionary Accruals Long-term discretionary accruals for firm j in year t 
∆ARj,t Change in Accounts Receivables Accounts receivable at end year t less accounts receivable 
at end year t-1 for firm j 
∆INVj,t Change in Inventories Inventory at end year t less inventory at end year t-1 for 
firm j 
∆OCAj,t Change in Other Current Assets Other current assets at end year t less other current assets 
at end year t-1 for firm j 
∆APj,t Change in Accounts Payable Accounts payable at end year t less accounts payable at 
end year t-1 for firm j 
∆TXPj,t Change in Tax Payable Tax payable at end year t less tax payable at end year t-1 
for firm j 
∆OCLj,t Change in Other Current Liabilities Other current liabilities at end year t less other current 
liabilities at end year t-1 for firm j 
ROEjt Return on Equity EBjt / BVjt 
LEVjt Leverage TAjt / TLjt 
TAjt Total Assets Total Assets for firm j at end year t 
TLjt Total Liabilities Total Liabilities for firm j at end year t 
NEjt Negative Earnings NE = 1 if firm j has negative earnings in year t, 0 
otherwise 
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Table 3-2  Summary of Models 
Value-relevance Model [1] 
Pjt = α0 + α1Ejt + α2 BVjt + τjt 
Earnings-Management Model [2] 
Pjt = β0 + β1 Djt + β2 Ejt + β3 Ejt Djt +β4 BVjt + β5 BVjt Djt + ϖjt 
Extended-Earnings-Management Model [3] 
Pjt = φ0 + φ1Sjt + φ2Ljt + φ3Ejt + φ4EjtSjt + φ5EjtLjt + φ6BVjt + φ7BVjtSjt + φ8BVjtLjt + ξjt 
Value-relevance Model with Control Variables [1a] 
Pjt = α0 + α1Ejt + α2BVjt + α3ROEjt + α4LEVjt + α5NEjt  + υjt   
Earnings-Management Model with Control Variables [2a] 
Pjt = β0 + β1Ejt + β2EjtDjt + β3BVjt + β4BVjtDjt + β5ROEjt + β6LEVjt  + β7NEjt  + ζjt   
Extended-Earnings-Management Model with Control Variables [3a] 
Pjt = φ0 + φ1Ejt + φ2EjtSjt + φ3EjtLjt + φ4BVjt + φ5BVjtSjt + φ6BVjtLjt  
                      + φ7ROEjt + φ8LEVjt + φ9NEjt  + νjt  
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Table 3-3  Summary of Hypotheses 
H10: α2 = 0, α3 = 0 Equation [1] Hypothesis 1: Earnings and book 
value are value-relevant. H11: α2 > 0, α3 > 0 
 
H2A0: β3 = 0, β5 = 0 Equation [2] 
Hypothesis 2A: The value-relevance 
of earnings is reduced and the value-
relevance of book value is increased 
when firms manage earnings via total 
discretionary accruals. 
H2A1: β3 < 0, β5 > 0 
 
H2B0: β3 = 0, β5 = 0 
H2B1: β3 < 0, β5 > 0 
Equation [2] Hypothesis 2B: The value-relevance 
of earnings is reduced and the value-
relevance of book value is increased 
when firms manage earnings via 
short-term discretionary accruals. 
H2B0: φ4 = 0, φ7 = 0 
H2B1: φ4 < 0, φ7 > 0 
Equation [3] 
H2C0: β3 = 0, β5 = 0  
H2C1: β3 < 0, β5 > 0 
Equation [2] Hypothesis 2C: The value-relevance 
of earnings is reduced and the value-
relevance of book value is increased 
when firms manage earnings via long-
term discretionary accruals. 
H2C0: φ5 = 0, φ8 = 0 
H2C1: φ5 < 0, φ8 > 0 
Equation [3] 
H30: φ4 = φ5 , φ7 = φ8 Equation [3] 
Hypothesis 3: Earnings management 
via long-term discretionary accruals 
has a greater impact on the value-
relevance of earnings and book value 
than earnings management via short-
term discretionary accruals. 
H31: φ4 > φ5 , φ7 < φ8 
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CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter details the results from the tests of hypotheses presented in Chapter Three. 
Section 4.2 outlines the sample selection and Section 4.3 presents the results of the 
univariate analysis. Section 4.4 describes the development of the dummy variables for 
earnings management through the estimation of total, short-term, and long-term 
discretionary accruals.  The results of the tests of hypotheses are presented in Section 
4.5. The sensitivity analysis discussed in Section 4.6 includes estimation of the models 
incorporating control variables, using an alternate benchmark for the earnings 
management allocation and using alternate measures of earnings. Section 4.7 provides a 
summary of the findings. 
4.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The initial sample included all firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
with a balance date of June 30. The stock price and financial data were obtained from 
the SIRCA ASX and Aspect databases respectively. Whilst these databases contain a 
comprehensive selection of ASX listed firms, discrepancies between the databases 
resulted in missing observations and the subsequent removal of firms from the sample. 
The inconsistencies primarily relate to changes in firm names and the associate code 
changes. The price data are listed using the code at the time of the stock trade, 
regardless of any subsequent name changes. However, the accounting data are listed 
using the most recent code for the firm. Thus, the price data and accounting data for the 
same firm and year may be listed under two different codes. Whilst every effort was 
made to identify these firms and make the appropriate changes, the situation was further 
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exacerbated by the incomplete list of company name changes provided with the 
databases. 
Firms in the financial, banking and insurance industries (ASX Sectors3 16, 17, 19 & 20) 
were excluded from the sample. This eliminated firms in industries with regulations that 
may potentially affect the use of discretionary. As OLS regression is used to determine 
the dummy variables for earnings management, it is necessary to only include industries 
with sufficient firm observations to ensure unbiased estimation of the regression 
models. Thus, industries with less than 10 firms in any one year were excluded from the 
sample. This resulted in the removal of firms in ASX Sectors 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, and 14. 
The remaining 2900 firm observations are drawn from 807 firms. Table 4-1 outlines the 
sample distribution across the five years 1997 to 2001. This sample is used to test 
Hypothesis 1 which states that earnings and book value are value-relevant. 
Table 4-1  Sample for Value-relevance Model – Equation [1] 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Pooled 
All Firms June 30 Balance Date 924 988 1064 1085 1104 5165
Less  
    Missing Data 179 215 260 196 234 1084
    ASX Sectors 16, 17, 19 & 20 167 178 188 178 183 894
    Outliers 24 21 34 25 29 133
    ASX Sectors 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, & 14 32 33 31 32 26 154
Sample 522 541 551 654 632 2900
Notes:  
Data missing from either the SIRCA ASX or Aspect databases. 
ASX Sectors 16, 17, 19 & 20 are financial, banking and insurance industries. 
Outliers are in the top and bottom 1% of earnings, top 1% of book value, or negative book value4. 
ASX Sectors 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, & 14 are industries with less than 10 firm observations in any one year. 
                                                 
3 ASX Sectors are listed in Appendix 1. 
4 Due to the sensitivity of regression to extreme outliers, firm observations were eliminated if they fell in 
the top or bottom 1% of earnings per share, the top 1% of book value per share or negative book value 
per share. 
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The tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 examine the market response to earnings and book 
value in the presence of earnings management. This requires the categorization of each 
firm as either engaging in earnings management or not. Examining the absolute value of 
a firm’s discretionary accruals relative to other firms in the same industry establishes 
the presence of earnings management. The absolute value is used as it is the size of the 
discretionary accruals rather than the direction that is an indicator of earnings 
management (Becker et al 1998; Francis et al 1999; Krishnan 2003). 
The hypotheses are tested for two alternative measures of earnings management. The 
first approach uses the industry median for absolute discretionary accruals as the 
benchmark to divide the sample with firms above the median being classified as 
earnings management firms and those below the median as non-earnings management 
firms. The second approach allocates firms using industry quartiles. A firm is deemed to 
engage in earnings management if the absolute value of its discretionary accruals is in 
the top quartile in the industry. Firms in the bottom quartile are deemed to not engage in 
earnings management. This classification method requires a more rigorous allocation of 
firms than when using the median, thus allowing stronger tests of the hypotheses. For 
this reason, the quartile benchmark is used for the primary analysis in this study. 
Tables 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 provide summaries of the samples resulting from the use of 
dummy variables created using industry quartiles. This measure of earnings 
management excludes the middle two quartiles from the sample. The observations are 
removed on the basis of their discretionary accruals within each industry rather than for 
the sample as a whole. Consequently, the number of observations excluded was not 
exactly half of the original sample. The earnings management dummy variable was 
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generated for each of the three forms of earnings management as measured by total 
discretionary accruals, short-term discretionary accruals, and long-term discretionary 
accruals. The creation of the dummy variable based on total discretionary accruals 
resulted in the exclusion of 1452 firm observations, leaving a sample of 1448. When the 
short-term earnings management dummy variable was created, 1441 of the original 
2900 firm observations were eliminated, resulting in a sample size of 1459. Only 1408 
firm observations were removed when creating the long-term earnings management 
dummy variable, resulting in a sample size of 1492. These samples were used for the 
tests of Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C which examine the value-relevance of earnings in 
the presence of earnings management. 
Table 4-2  Sample for Earnings-Management Model – Equation [2] 
Earnings Management via Total Discretionary Accruals 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Pooled 
Full Sample 522 541 551 654 632 2900 
Less      Middle Quartiles 260 268 280 327 317 1452 
Sample 262 273 271 327 315 1448 
 
Table 4-3  Sample for Earnings-Management Model – Equation [2] 
Earnings Management via Short-term Discretionary Accruals 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Pooled 
Full Sample 522 541 551 654 632 2900 
Less      Middle Quartiles 260 266 280 322 313 1441 
Sample 262 275 271 332 319 1459 
 
Table 4-4  Sample for Earnings-Management Model – Equation [2] 
Earnings Management via Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Pooled 
Full Sample 522 541 551 654 632 2900 
Less      Middle Quartiles 255 259 275 314 305 1408 
Sample 267 282 276 340 327 1492 
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Additional loss of firm observations occurred when preparing the sample to run the 
regressions for the Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]). As the 
model requires values for both the short-term and long-term earnings management 
dummy variables, firm observations without values for either of these variables were 
eliminated. For example, a firm may be in the top or bottom quartile for short-term 
discretionary accruals but may be in either of the middle quartiles for long-term 
discretionary accruals. Such a firm would not have a value for the long-term dummy 
variable and would be excluded from the sample.  
The absence of a value for the dummy variable is not an indication that the firm does 
not engage in earnings management. Rather, it means that the firm’s discretionary 
accruals did meet the criterion indicating either the presence or absence of earnings 
management. Consequently no value was assigned for the dummy variable.  
Table 4-5 reports that 2122 firm observations were removed due to the exclusion of the 
two middle quartiles based on both short-term and long-term discretionary accruals. 
This resulted in a final sample of 778 firm observations to be used to test the value-
relevance of earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals and earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals (Hypothesis 3). 
Table 4-5  Sample for Extended-Earnings-Management Model – Equation [3] 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Pooled 
Full Sample 522 541 551 654 632 2900 
Less      Middle Quartiles 386 395 415 470 456 2122 
Sample 136 146 136 184 176 778 
Table 4-6 provides a summary of the samples to be used for each of the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 is tested using the full sample of 2900 firm observations. Hypotheses 2A, 
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2B and 2C are tested using samples of 1448, 1459 and 1492 firm observations 
respectively. Hypothesis 3 is tested using the final sample of 778 firm observations. 
This sample is also used for a secondary test of Hypotheses 2B and 2C. 
Table 4-6  Samples for Tests of Hypotheses 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Pooled
H1: Earnings and book value are value-relevant. 522 541 551 654 632 2900 
H2A: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced 
and the value-relevance of book value is increased 
when firms manage earnings via total 
discretionary accruals. 
262 273 271 327 315 1448 
H2B: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced 
and the value-relevance of book value is increased 
when firms manage earnings via short-term 
discretionary accruals. 
262 275 271 332 319 1459 
H2C: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced 
and the value-relevance of book value is increased 
when firms manage earnings via long-term 
discretionary accruals. 
267 282 276 340 327 1492 
H3: Earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals has a greater impact on the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value than 
earnings management via short-term discretionary 
accruals. 
136 146 136 184 176 778 
4.3 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics were generated for the samples used to test each of the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 is tested using the full sample of 2900 firm observations. The descriptive 
statistics for the key variables in this model are presented in Table 4-7. 
The Earnings-Management Model is estimated for each of the three definitions of 
earnings management; (1) earnings management via total discretionary accruals, (2) 
earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals, and (3) earnings 
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management via long-term discretionary accruals. Table 4-8 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the sample used to estimate the Earnings-Management Model (Equation 
[2]) when the earnings management dummy variable is derived from discretionary 
accruals estimated by the Jones model (Jones 1991). The descriptive statistics for the 
sample based on earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals are 
reported in Table 4-9. Table 4-10 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample based 
on earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals.  
Table 4-7  Descriptive Statistics – Market, Accounting and Control Variables  
Sample for Value-Relevance Model – Equation [1]  
 ALL FIRMS     n = 2900 
 P E BV LEV ROE NE 
Mean 1.150 0.025 0.608 0.346 -0.527 0.566 
Standard Deviation 2.519 0.152 0.941 0.252 3.621 0.496 
Minimum 0.002 -0.630 0.000 0.000 -90.481 0.000 
Maximum 46.600 0.938 7.848 1.493 7.788 1.000 
Notes:       
E  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
BV -  Book value per share at time t 
P - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months 
LEV - Leverage (Total Assets/Total Liabilities) 
ROE - Return on Equity  
NE - Negative Earnings 
Regardless of the source of earnings management, firms that manage earnings display 
lower stock price, earnings per share and book value per share than non-earnings 
management firms. The lower earnings figures suggest firms that typically engage in 
earnings management are the poorer performing firms. Furthermore, the lower stock 
price indicates that the market may interpret the use of discretionary accruals as 
earnings management rather than as a signal to the market. As indicated by the standard 
deviation, the variability of stock price, earnings per share and book value per share is 
lower for earnings management firms. This may be the result of firms using earnings 
management to smooth earnings in an attempt demonstrate stability to the market. 
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Table 4-8  Descriptive Statistics – Market, Accounting and Control Variables 
Sample for Earnings-Management Model – Equation [2] 
Earnings Management via Total Discretionary Accruals  
 Earnings Management No Earnings Management 
  n = 716   n = 732  
 P E BV P E BV 
Mean 0.812 -0.021 0.343 1.392 0.050 0.787 
Standard Deviation 2.392 0.151 0.606 2.807 0.154 1.155 
Minimum 0.006 -0.630 0.000 0.002 -0.377 0.001 
Maximum 46.600 0.686 5.218 44.950 0.884 7.848 
Notes:    E  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
               BV -  Book value per share at time t 
               P - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months 
 
Table 4-9  Descriptive Statistics – Market, Accounting and Control Variables 
Sample for Earnings-Management Model – Equation [2] 
Earnings Management via Short-term Discretionary Accruals  
 Earnings Management No Earnings Management 
  n = 725   n = 734  
 P E BV P E BV 
Mean 0.836 0.009 0.418 1.393 0.037 0.813 
Standard Deviation 1.547 0.136 0.628 2.535 0.172 1.178 
Minimum 0.005 -0.630 0.000 0.006 -0.549 0.001 
Maximum 16.250 0.784 4.712 19.350 0.884 7.248 
Notes:    E  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
               BV -  Book value per share at time t 
               P - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months 
 
Table 4-10  Descriptive Statistics – Market, Accounting and Control Variables 
Sample for Earnings-Management Model – Equation [2] 
Earnings Management via Long-term Discretionary Accruals  
 Earnings Management No Earnings Management 
  n = 725   n = 734  
 P E BV P E BV 
Mean 0.696 -0.009 0.385 1.337 0.038 0.704 
Standard Deviation 1.495 0.144 0.697 2.909 0.147 1.056 
Minimum 0.005 -0.549 0.000 0.002 -0.462 0.001 
Maximum 13.481 0.938 5.165 44.950 0.796 7.848 
Notes:    E  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
               BV -  Book value per share at time t 
               P - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months 
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The Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]) includes dummy variables 
for earnings management via both short-term and long-term discretionary accruals. The 
sample used for the estimation of this model includes firms that engage in earnings 
management through the use of either short-term discretionary accruals, long-term 
discretionary accruals or both. Consequently, firms in this sample fall into one of four 
categories;  
(1)  No earnings management,  
(2)  Earnings management via both short-term and long-term discretionary 
accruals,  
(3)  Earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals only, or  
(4)  Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals only. 
 
Table 4-11 provides descriptive statistics for the market and accounting variables for the 
sample of 778 firm observations and separated into the four categories outlined above. 
A preliminary examination of the descriptive statistics reveals differences in the key 
variables between the categories. Firms with earnings management exhibit lower stock 
price, earnings per share and book value per share than firms with no earnings 
management. Moreover, firms using long-term rather than short-term discretionary 
accruals to manage earnings have lower stock price, earnings per share and book value 
per share. This suggests a differential role of short-term versus long-term discretionary 
accruals as the means of earnings management. 
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Table 4-11  Descriptive Statistics – Market, Accounting and Control Variables 
Sample for Extended-Earnings-Management Model – Equation [3]  
ALL FIRMS     n = 778    
 P E BV    
Mean 0.982 0.012 0.544    
Standard Deviation 1.969 0.145 0.897    
Minimum 0.006 -0.549 0.000    
Maximum 16.250 0.784 7.191    
       
       
 (1) No Earnings Management (2) Earnings Management 
  Short-term AND Long-term 
  n = 235   n = 310  
 P E BV P E BV 
Mean 1.243 0.034 0.813 0.653 -0.004 0.356 
Standard Deviation 2.275 0.138 1.180 1.229 0.114 0.607 
Minimum 0.007 -0.327 0.001 0.006 -0.501 0.000 
Maximum 15.900 0.774 7.191 9.990 0.607 4.712 
       
       
 (3) Earnings Management (4) Earnings Management 
 Short-term only Long-term only 
  n = 112   n = 121  
 P E BV P E BV 
Mean 1.226 0.029 0.541 1.097 -0.004 0.509 
Standard Deviation 2.198 0.169 0.676 2.486 0.193 0.932 
Minimum 0.007 -0.430 0.001 0.006 -0.549 0.003 
Maximum 16.250 0.784 3.182 13.481 0.686 5.165 
Notes:       
E  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
BV -  Book value per share at time t 
P - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months 
LEV - Leverage (Total Assets/Total Liabilities) 
ROE - Return on Equity  
NE - Negative Earnings 
The development of the dummy variables required the calculation of total, short-term 
and long-term accruals. Table 4-12 presents descriptive statistics for total, short-term 
and long-term accruals scaled by total assets. The mean total accruals are negative at 
9.7% of total assets. However there is a clear distinction between the short-term and 
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long-term component of accruals. The mean short-term accruals are positive at 4.2% of 
total assets whereas mean long-term accruals are negative at 13.9% of total assets. The 
standard deviation, maximum and minimum values suggest considerable variation in 
these components of accruals. However, for both short-term and long-term accruals, 
approximately 96% of firms have accruals within one standard deviation of the mean. 
The firms with extreme values for short-term and long-term accruals are not excluded 
from the sample as outliers because these are potentially the earnings management firms 
that are the focus of this study.  
Table 4-12  Descriptive Statistics – Accruals 
 Full Sample     n = 2900 
 ACC STACC LTACC 
Mean -0.097 0.042 -0.139 
Standard Deviation 1.086 0.708 0.828 
Minimum -26.811 -3.808 -27.197 
Maximum 27.291 27.443 7.163 
Notes:    
ACC – Total Accruals scaled by Total Assets 
STACC – Short-term Accruals scaled by Total Assets 
LTACC – Long-term Accruals scaled by Total Assets 
The positive-mean short-term accruals suggest that firms use short-term accruals to 
manage earnings upwards. Conversely, the negative-mean long-term accruals imply the 
downward management of earnings via long-term accruals. This indicates a need to 
distinguish between short-term and long-term discretionary accruals when determining 
the presence and impact of earnings management. Application of the Jones model 
(Jones 1991) provides an estimate of total discretionary accruals in which the positive 
short-term accruals may be offset by the negative long-term accruals thus masking 
earnings management. This supports the need for separate models to estimate the short-
term and long-term discretionary accruals.  
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4.3.2 Correlation Coefficients 
Tables 4-13 and 4-14 report the Pearson correlation coefficients measuring the 
relationship between stock price and each of the independent variables, earnings per 
share and book-value per share. Correlation coefficients were calculated for the full 
sample and for the sub-samples of earnings management and non-earnings management 
firms based on the three sources of earnings management.  
When firms manage earnings via total or short-term discretionary accruals, there is a 
reduction in the strength of the relationship between earnings and price, and between 
book value and price. However, for earnings management via long-term discretionary 
accruals the decline in correlation between earnings and price is offset by an increase in 
correlation between book value and price. This suggests that earnings management via 
long-term discretionary accruals has a different effect on value-relevance than other 
forms of earnings management. 
 
Table 4-13   Pearson Correlation of Earnings with Price & Book Value with Price 
Samples for Value-relevance and Earnings Management Models 
  Correlation with Price 
Hypothesis EPS BVPS n 
H1 All Firms 0.597*** 0.651*** 2900 
H2A No Earnings Management 0.678*** 0.710*** 732 
 Earnings Management via Total 
Discretionary Accruals 0.437*** 0.498*** 716 
 All Firms 0.576*** 0634*** 1448 
H2B No Earnings Management 0.718*** 0.750*** 734 
 Earnings Management via Short-term 
Discretionary Accruals 0.532*** 0.656*** 725 
 All Firms 0.657*** 0.731*** 1459 
H2C No Earnings Management 0.618*** 0.635*** 748 
 Earnings Management via Long-term 
Discretionary Accruals 0.588*** 0.799*** 744 
 All Firms 0.590*** 0.793*** 1492 
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, two-tailed.    
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Table 4-14   Pearson Correlation of Earnings with Price & Book Value with Price 
Sample for Extended-Earnings-Management Model  
  Correlation with Price 
Hypothesis EPS BVPS n 
H3 No Earnings Management 0.733*** 0.708*** 235 
 Earnings Management via Short-term and 
Long-term Discretionary Accruals 0.485*** 0.751*** 310 
 Earnings Management via Short-term 
Discretionary Accruals 0.572*** 0.519*** 112 
 Earnings Management via Long-term 
Discretionary Accruals 0.712*** 0.827*** 121 
 All Firms 0.642*** 0.707*** 778 
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, two-tailed.    
Where there is no earnings management, earnings per share displays a higher 
correlation with price (ρ = 0.733, p = 0.00) than does book value per share (ρ = 0.708, p 
= 0.00). However, when a firm engages in earnings management via both short-term 
and long-term discretionary accruals, this relationship is reversed. The correlation 
between price and earnings per share is lower in the presence of earnings management 
(ρ = 0.485, p = 0.00) whereas the correlation between price and book value per share is 
higher (ρ = 0.751, p = 0.00). This is consistent with the proposition that earnings 
management reduces the value-relevance of earnings and increases the value-relevance 
of book value.  
The differential impact of short-term versus long-term discretionary accruals is also 
evident in these correlations. When earnings management is via short-term discretionary 
accruals alone, the correlation of earnings with price (ρ = 0.572, p = 0.00) is greater 
than the correlation of book value with price (ρ = 0.519, p = 0.00). However, the 
correlations are weaker than for firms with no earnings management, suggesting that 
earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals reduces the value-relevance 
of both earnings and book value.  
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In contrast, when earnings management is via long-term discretionary accruals alone, 
the correlation of earnings with price (ρ = 0.712, p = 0.00) is less than the correlation of 
book value with price (ρ = 0.824, p = 0.00). These figures represent a weaker 
relationship with earnings but a stronger relationship with book value compared to firms 
with no earnings management.  
4.4 DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
Chapter Three presented three models to estimate the discretionary component of 
accruals to be used in developing dummy variables to represent earnings management. 
The first model provides an estimate of total discretionary accruals and is commonly 
referred to as the Jones model (Jones 1991). Using this model as a foundation, two other 
models were developed; one to estimate short-term discretionary accruals and the other 
to estimate long-term discretionary accruals.  
In order to apply these models it is first necessary to estimate total accruals and its 
short-term and long-term components. This is achieved through the application of 
Equations [4] through [6] as presented in Section 3.6. Total accruals are calculated as 
the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and cash flows from 
operations (Equation [4]). Short-term accruals are estimated as the change in non-cash 
current assets less the change in current liabilities (Equation [5]). Long-term accruals 
are defined as the difference between total accruals and short-term accruals (Equation 
[6]) as determined by Equations 4 and 5. 
The Jones Model, represented by Equation [7], uses change in revenue and the level of 
property, plant and equipment as the explanatory variables for predicting total accruals. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate this equation by industry for 
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each year. The resulting model is then used to calculate the expected total accruals for 
each firm. The same method is applied to estimate expected short-term accruals and 
expected long-term accruals. Equation [9] models the relationship between short-term 
accruals and change in revenue. Equation [11] models property, plant and equipment, 
intangibles, and non-current provisions as explanatory variables for long-term accruals.  
The calculation of the total, short-term, or long-term discretionary accruals requires the 
estimation of 140 regression equations, covering 14 industries across 5 years. As the 
results of these estimations are too numerous to efficiently report, an example for one 
industry is presented in Appendix 2. Additionally, Equations [7], [9] and [11] were also 
estimated for the full sample to demonstrate the explanatory power of these models. The 
results of these regressions are presented in Tables 4-15, 4-16, and 4-17.  
Table 4-15 Estimation of Jones Model for Total Accruals 
Equation [7]:  ACCt = ϕ1 + ϕ2∆REVt + ϕ3PPEt  + ε 
Adj R2 γ1 γ2 γ3 N 
0.201 169,061.86 0.20 -0.25 2900 
(244.88)*** (13.37)*** (27.16)*** (16.82)***  
Notes:     
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
Pooled:  1997-2001 
Table 4-16 Estimation of Short-term Accrual Model 
Equation [9]:  STACCt = γ1 + γ2∆REVt + ε 
Adj R2 γ1 γ2 N 
0.319 372,733.68 0.15 2900 
(680.93)*** (35.98)*** (26.00)***  
Notes:    
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
Pooled:  1997-2001 
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Table 4-17 Estimation of Long-Term Accrual Model 
Equation [11]:  LTACCt = η1 + η2PPEt + η3INTt + η4NCPt + ε 
Adj R2 η1 η2 η3 η4 N 
0.191 -247,201.34 -0.19 -0.05 -0.41 2900 
(172.57)*** (21.50)*** (9.27)*** (2.90)*** (2.54)**  
Notes:      
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.   
Pooled:  1997-2001      
All three models are significant at the 1% level. The Jones model has an explanatory 
power of 20.1%. The short-term model has a higher explanatory power of 31.9% 
whereas the long-term model has a slightly lower explanatory power of 19.1%. The 
positive intercept and coefficients in the short-term model suggest an expectation of 
positive short-term accruals. Conversely, the negative intercept and coefficients in the 
long-term model suggest an expectation of negative long-term accruals. This is also 
reflected in the coefficients in the Jones model. The coefficient on change in revenue is 
positive and the coefficient on property, plant and equipment is negative. These results 
are consistent with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4-12. 
The calculation of the discretionary component of accruals requires the assumption that 
the expected level of accruals represents the non-discretionary component. That is, the 
discretionary component is the difference between the actual and the expected accruals. 
This difference is calculated using Equations [8], [10] and [12] for total accruals, short-
term accruals and long-term accruals respectively. For the full sample of 2900 firm 
observations, the mean short-term discretionary accruals is -0.007, which is not 
significantly different from zero (t = 1.07, p = 0.284).  
This is indicative of the reversing nature of short-term accruals. By definition, short-
term accruals are expected to exist only in the short-run with the market anticipating 
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reversal within one accounting period. Therefore, an average of zero for short-term 
discretionary accruals may simply reflect positive accruals in one year canceling out 
negative accruals from the previous year. This explanation does not apply for long-term 
accruals as the reversal may occur at any time in the future. The mean long-term 
discretionary accruals of -0.055 is significantly different from zero (t = 5.21, p = 0.000). 
This suggests that long-term accruals may be used for downward earnings management.  
As discussed in Section 4.2, the industry median and quartiles were used to allocate 
firms as either earnings management firms or non-earnings management firms. The 
absolute values are used as it is the size and not the direction of the discretionary 
accruals that reflects earnings management. Table 4-18 provides a comparison of the 
mean absolute discretionary accruals for earnings management and non-earnings 
management firms.  
Table 4-18  Comparison of Mean Absolute Discretionary Accruals for Earnings 
Management and Non-Earnings Management Firms  
 EM Firms Non-EM Firms   
 Mean Mean Difference in Means n 
Absolute Total 
Discretionary Accruals 
0.5236 
 
0.0261 
 
0.4976 
(13.84)*** 
1488 
 
Absolute Short-term 
Discretionary Accruals 
0.4031 
 
0.0154 
 
0.3876 
(22.75)*** 
1459 
 
Absolute Long-term 
Discretionary Accruals 
0.5712 
 
0.1063 
 
0.4649 
(8.76)*** 
1492 
 
Notes:     
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
EM - Earnings Management 
Absolute Discretionary Accruals scaled by Total Assets 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Calculated assuming unequal variances. 
The allocation method generates groups with significantly different means for short-
term discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary accruals. The means are in line 
with expectations given the allocation method. That is, the mean absolute discretionary 
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accruals are higher for firms with earnings management than for firms with no earnings 
management. 
As the discretionary accruals generated by these models are scaled by total assets, the 
values can be interpreted as a percentage of total assets. For firms that manage earnings, 
the mean absolute discretionary accruals is 52.36% of total assets compared to only 
2.61% for non-earnings management firms. Similar differences are apparent for short-
term and long-term discretionary accruals. The mean absolute short-term discretionary 
accruals for earnings management firms is 40.31% of total assets and 1.54% for non-
earnings management firms. The proportions are greater for long-term discretionary 
accruals. For earnings management firms, mean long-term discretionary accruals are 
57.12% of total assets whereas for non-earnings management firms, the mean is 
10.63%. Again, this demonstrates the differential role played by short-term and long-
term discretionary accruals. Thus, if the market is cognizant of the use of accruals, it is 
expected that long-term discretionary accruals would have a greater effect on market 
behavior than short-term discretionary accruals. 
4.5 TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
4.5.1 Value-relevance Model 
Chapter Three presented the Value-relevance Model (Equation [1]) to assess the value-
relevance of earnings and book value. The model is an empirical adaptation of Ohlson’s 
valuation framework (Ohlson 1995) in which earning and book value are regressed 
against stock price. Value-relevance is measured by the coefficients on earnings and 
book value. Thus, Equation [1] is a test of the value-relevance of earnings and book 
value. 
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Hypothesis 1: Earnings and book value are value-relevant. 
Table 4-19 presents the results for the Equation [1] regression using the full sample of 
2900 firm observations. The coefficient estimates and the explanatory power of the 
model are consistent with past research (Collins et al 1997; Ou & Sepe 2002), thus 
confirming the value-relevance of earnings and book value for firms in this sample. 
Whilst the response coefficients for both earnings and book value are positive and 
significant, they are slightly higher than found in previous studies. This may be due to 
the different time period being examined or due to the use of Australian rather than US 
data.  
Table 4-19  Value-relevance of Earnings and Book Value 
Equation [1]: Pt = α0 + α1 Et + α2 BVt + ε  
Sample Adj R2 α1 α2 n 
Pooled 0.477 5.02 1.22 2900 
  (6.50)*** (9.24)***  
1997 0.698 3.88 1.40 522 
  (5.51)*** (12.09)***  
1998 0.617 3.42 1.19 541 
  (4.00)*** (5.91)***  
1999 0.558 6.90 0.86 551 
  (5.23)*** (5.74)***  
2000 0.434 3.91 1.50 654 
  (2.60)*** (4.08)***  
2001 0.364 6.91 1.25 632 
  (2.48)** (2.66)***  
Notes:     
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t  
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months  
An important premise in this research is the trade-off between earnings and book value 
in the valuation process. As such, it is interesting to note the oscillating nature of the 
estimated coefficients over the five years of the study. In general, as the response 
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coefficient for earnings declines from one year to the next, the response coefficient for 
book value increases, and vice versa. As the sample of firms is not consistent across the 
years, it can only be assumed that this phenomenon is driven by economy-wide factors. 
The positive and significant coefficient estimates for the pooled and yearly regression 
support Hypothesis 1. That is, both earnings and book value are value-relevant. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on earnings (α1) is over four times larger than the 
coefficient on book value (α2), indicating that a dollar of earnings per share has over 
four times the impact on price as a dollar of book value per share. More specifically, a 
one cent increase in earnings per share is expected to generate a 5.02 cent increase in 
stock price per share, whilst a one cent increase in book value per share is expected to 
generate a stock price increase of 1.22 cents per share. 
4.5.1.1 Assessing the Assumptions 
OLS regression assumes constant variance of the residuals. However, when using panel 
data, it is common for the residuals to display heteroscedasticity. The residual plots 
from each of the estimated models indicated heteroscedasticity of the residuals. 
Additionally, the residuals from the estimation of Equation [1] were tested for 
heteroscedasticity using both the Breusch-Pagan Test (Breusch and Pagan 1979) and the 
White Test (White 1980). Although these tests are very similar, the White Test can be 
more generally applied as it does not assume prior knowledge of the source of the 
heteroscedasticity and is less sensitive to violations of the normality assumption. 
However, a limitation of the White Test is its potential to indicate heteroscedasticity 
when in fact the model is simply mis-specified (Thursby 1982). Table 4-20 presents 
details of these tests which both indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 4-20   Equation [1] - Tests for Heteroscedasticity 
 H0:  σ2i = σ2   for all i 
 H1:  σ2i  ≠ σ2 
 Chi-square 
Breusch-Pagan Test 42.267*** 
White Test 109.486*** 
Notes:  
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
As heteroscedasticity may lead to inefficient coefficient estimates, the t-statistics for the 
estimated regressions coefficients of the model were calculated using White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. This overcomes the problem of biased and 
inconsistent covariance estimates which would result in invalid tests of the hypotheses. 
Table 4-21 presents a comparison of standard t-statistics for Equation [1] with those 
calculated using White’s standard errors. The estimated coefficients are significant at 
the 1% level and thus there are no changes to the inferences drawn from Value-
relevance Model (Equation [1]). That is, earnings and book value are value-relevant. 
Table 4-21   Value-relevance of Earnings and Book Value:  
A Comparison of Results Using White’s t-statistics  
Equation [1]: Pt = α0 + α1 Et + α2 BVt + ε  
 Adj R2 α1 α2 n 
Pooled 0.477 5.02 1.22 2900 
Standard  (17.16)*** (25.90)***  
White#  (6.50)*** (9.24)***  
Notes:     
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t  
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months  
#  t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
4.5.2 Earnings Management Model 
The Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]) examines the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value in the presence of earnings management. This is achieved 
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through the addition to Equation [1] of a slope dummy variable to represent earnings 
management. The development of the dummy variable was discussed in Section 4.4. 
The estimated coefficients are used to test Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C which test the 
impact of earning management via total discretionary accruals, short-term discretionary 
accruals and long-term discretionary accruals respectively. The results reported in the 
following sections are based on the samples discussed in section 4.2. Results for the full 
sample of 2900 firm observations using the industry median as the allocation 
benchmark are included in the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.7.  
4.5.2.1 Hypothesis 2A 
Hypothesis 2A states that the value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-
relevance of book value is increased when firms manage earnings via total discretionary 
accruals. This hypothesis is tested by estimating Equation [2] using the earnings 
management dummy variable derived from the Jones model (Jones 1991). Table 4-22 
presents the results of the OLS regressions for the pooled sample and by year. 
The significant coefficient on earnings (β2 = 6.35, p = 0.000) demonstrates the value-
relevance of earnings in the absence of earnings management. Likewise, the significant 
coefficient on book value (β4 = 1.12, p = 0.000) demonstrates the value-relevance of 
book value. 
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Table 4-22  Earnings Management Model 
Earnings Management via Total Discretionary Accruals 
Equation [2]: Pt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Et + β3 Et Dt + β4 BVt + β5 BVt Dt + ε   
Sample Adj R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 n 
Pooled 0.461 0.19 6.35 -2.02 1.12 0.38 1448 
  (1.10) (7.57)*** (0.99) (5.04)*** (1.36)  
1997 0.785 -0.14 9.15 -7.12 0.82 1.34 262 
  (0.84) (4.38)*** (3.26)*** (4.49)*** (3.90)***  
1998 0.599 -0.04 6.01 -5.06 0.74 0.36 273 
  (0.22) (3.05)*** (2.11)** (3.20)*** (1.11)  
1999 0.557 0.32 5.91 1.01 0.94 0.12 271 
  (1.21) (3.68)*** (0.27) (4.94)*** (0.25)  
2000 0.690 -0.11 5.80 -5.52 1.16 0.05 327 
  (0.68) (3.54)*** (3.16)*** (3.61)*** (0.14)  
2001 0.382 1.10 5.54 4.86 2.04 0.27 315 
  (1.47)** (2.42)** (0.73) (2.05)** (0.22)  
Notes:        
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.   
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Dt - Earnings management via total discretionary accruals – Jones Model (Allocation by quartiles) 
D = 1  Firm engages in earnings management 
D = 0  Firm does not engage in earnings management 
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t    
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t     
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months     
 
However, the results indicate that earnings management via total discretionary accruals 
is not value-relevant in its own right, nor does it impact on the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value. This is demonstrated by the insignificant coefficient on the 
intercept dummy (β1 = 0.19, p = 0.272) and the insignificant coefficients on the earnings 
interaction variable (β3 = -2.02, p = 0.325) and the book value interaction variable (β5 = 
0.38, p = 0.175).  
Although not significant, the sign of the coefficients on the interaction variables are 
consistent with Hypothesis 2A. β3 is negative, indicating a decline in the value-
relevance of earnings when firms manage earnings via total discretionary accruals. β5 is 
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positive, indicating an increase in the value-relevance of book value when firms manage 
earnings via total discretionary accruals. The coefficient on the interaction variable for 
earnings is significant in three of the five yearly regressions and is significant in only 
one year for book value. However, the coefficients for the pooled regression lead to the 
rejection of Hypothesis 2A.  
4.5.2.2 Hypothesis 2B 
Hypothesis 2B states that the value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-
relevance of book value is increased when firms manage earnings via short-term 
discretionary accruals. This hypothesis is tested by estimating Equation [2] using the 
earnings management dummy variable derived from short-term discretionary accruals. 
Table 4-23 presents the results of the OLS regressions for the pooled sample and by 
year.  
The insignificant coefficient on the intercept dummy (β1 = -0.05, p = 0.582) indicates 
that earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals is not value-relevant in 
its own right. However, the impact of earnings management is evident in the 
coefficients on the interaction terms.  
The coefficient on earnings (β2 = 5.79, p = 0.000) represents the market’s reaction to 
earnings in the absence of earnings management. For firms with earnings management, 
the market’s reaction to earnings is reduced, as reflected in the negative coefficient on 
the earnings interaction variable (β3 = -2.93, p = 0.014). The reaction to earnings 
declines from 5.79 to 2.86 in the presence of earnings management via short-term 
discretionary accruals. 
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Table 4-23   Earnings Management Model 
Earnings Management via Short-term Discretionary Accruals 
Equation [2]: Pt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Et + β3 Et Dt + β4 BVt + β5 BVt Dt + ε   
Sample Adj R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 n 
Pooled 0.608 -0.05 5.79 -2.93 1.05 0.23 1459 
  (0.55) (6.25)*** (2.45)** (9.42)*** (1.38)  
1997 0.735 -0.21 6.24 -3.74 1.07 0.60 262 
  (1.26) (4.25)*** (2.21)** (5.92)*** (1.43)  
1998 0.704 -0.03 4.72 -3.71 1.06 0.45 275 
  (0.17) (3.08)*** (1.67)* (5.02)*** (1.29)  
1999 0.545 -0.02 9.52 -1.98 0.77 0.011 271 
  (0.08) (3.56)*** (0.44) (2.98)*** (0.02)  
2000 0.642 0.13 3.62 -2.38 1.32 0.00 332 
  (0.78) (3.39)*** (1.51)** (5.24)*** (0.01)  
2001 0.530 -0.19 5.76 -3.11 0.98 0.20 319 
  (0.80) (2.00)** (1.02) (3.58)*** (0.55)  
Notes:        
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.   
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Dt - Earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles) 
D = 1  Firm engages in earnings management 
D = 0  Firm does not engage in earnings management 
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t    
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t     
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months     
 
The market’s reaction to book value in the absence of earnings management is 
represented by the coefficient on book value (β4 = 1.05, p = 0.000). The insignificant 
coefficient on the book value interaction variable (β5 = 0.23, p = 0.168) indicates that 
earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals has no impact on the value-
relevance of book value.  
Thus, the coefficient estimates from the pooled regression lead to the rejection of 
Hypothesis 2B. β3 is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating a decline in the 
value-relevance of earnings when firms manage earnings via short-term discretionary 
accruals. However, although β5 is positive it is not significant, indicating that the value-
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relevance of book value is unaffected when firms manage earnings via short-term 
discretionary accruals.  
4.5.2.3 Hypothesis 2C 
Hypothesis 2C states that the value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-
relevance of book value is increased when firms manage earnings via long-term 
discretionary accruals. This hypothesis is tested by estimating Equation [2] using the 
earnings management dummy variable derived from long-term discretionary accruals. 
Table 4-24 presents the results of the OLS regressions for the pooled sample and by 
year.  
Table 4-24    Earnings-Management Model  
Earnings Management via Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
Equation [2]: Pt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Et + β3 Et Dt + β4 BVt + β5 BVt Dt + ε   
Sample Adj R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 n 
Pooled 0.525 -0.15 7.14 -5.59 1.12 0.39 1492 
  (1.06) (5.71)*** (4.13)*** (4.37)*** (1.35)  
1997 0.726 -0.31 5.00 -2.72 1.19 0.53 267 
  (1.82)* (4.03)*** (1.81)* (7.73)*** (1.38)***  
1998 0.575 0.00 6.51 -6.12 1.07 0.00 282 
  (0.01) (3.03)*** (2.41)** (2.31)** (0.00)  
1999 0.626 -0.28 8.95 -5.43 0.78 0.83 276 
  (1.45) (2.95)*** (1.63) (3.00)*** (2.20)**  
2000 0.511 -0.37 9.62 -8.75 0.45 1.05 340 
  (2.17)** (2.57)** (2.29)** (1.29) (2.78)***  
2001 0.437 0.42 4.40 -2.96 2.31 -0.55 327 
  (0.62) (1.80)* (1.10) (1.63) (0.37)  
Notes:        
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.   
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Dt - Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles) 
D = 1  Firm engages in earnings management 
D = 0  Firm does not engage in earnings management 
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t    
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t     
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months     
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The coefficient on the intercept dummy (β1 = -0.15, p = 0.289) is not significant 
suggesting that earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals is not value-
relevant in its own right.  
The coefficient on earnings (β2 = 7.14, p = 0.000) represents the market’s reaction to a 
firm’s earnings in the absence of earnings management. For firms with earnings 
management, the market’s reaction to earnings is reduced, as reflected in the negative 
coefficient on the earnings interaction variable (β3 = -5.59, p = 0.000). The reaction to 
earnings declines from 7.14 to 1.55 in the presence of earnings management via long-
term discretionary accruals. 
The market’s reaction to book value in the absence of earnings management is 
represented by the coefficient on book value (β4 = 1.12, p = 0.000). The impact of 
earnings management is reflected in the coefficient on the book value interaction 
variable (β5 = 0.39, p = 0.178). This coefficient is not significant for the pooled 
regression but is significant in three of the five yearly regressions. Whilst this suggests 
support for the hypothesis, the pooled regression indicates that earnings management 
via long-term discretionary accruals has no impact on the value-relevance of book 
value. 
The coefficient estimates in the pooled regression of Equation [2] do not support 
Hypothesis 2C. The coefficient β3 is negative and significant, indicating a decline in the 
value-relevance of earnings when firms manage earnings via long-term discretionary 
accruals. However, β5 is not significant, indicating that the value-relevance of book 
value is unaffected by via long-term discretionary accruals.  
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4.5.2.4 Assessing the Assumptions 
The use of pooled regression leads to the possibility estimation bias due to 
heteroscedasticity. This is addressed through the use of t-statistics based on White’s 
standard errors. Table 4-25 presents a comparison of standard t-statistics for the 
Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]) with those calculated using White’s 
standard errors. 
Table 4-25  Earnings-Management Model  
A Comparison of Results Using White’s t-statistics  
Equation [2]: Pt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Et + β3 Et Dt + β4 BVt + β5 BVt Dt + ε 
 Adj R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 n 
Total        
   Pooled 0.461 0.19 6.35 -2.02 1.12 0.38 1448 
   Standard  (1.55) (9.55)*** (2.38)** (12.57)*** (2.41)**  
   White#  (1.10) (7.57)*** (0.99) (5.04)*** (1.36)  
Short-term        
   Pooled 0.608 -0.05 5.79 -2.93 1.05 0.23 1459 
   Standard  (0.56) (15.21)*** (5.08)*** (18.90)*** (2.11)**  
   White#  (0.55) (6.25)*** (2.45)** (9.42)*** (1.38)  
Long-term        
   Pooled 0.525 -0.15 7.14 -5.59 1.12 0.39 1492 
   Standard  (1.43) (13.84)*** (7.60)*** (15.59)*** (3.04)***  
   White#  (1.06) (5.71)*** (4.13)*** (4.37)*** (1.35)  
Notes:        
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
Dt - Earnings management via short-term/long-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles) 
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t   
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t     
Pt - Stock price at time t + 3 months     
#  t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors   
The impact of earnings management on the value-relevance of earnings and book value 
is less apparent after controlling for heteroscedasticity via White’s standard errors. 
When using standard t-statistics, the value-relevance of earnings declines and the value-
relevance of book value increases in the presence of earnings management. This holds 
true for earnings management via total discretionary accruals, short-term discretionary 
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accruals, and long-term discretionary accruals. Thus, Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C are 
not rejected when standard t-statistics are used as the basis for the tests. 
4.5.3 Extended-Earnings-Management Model 
The Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]) examines the relative 
impact of earnings management via short-term versus long-term discretionary accruals. 
Where the Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]) examines the impact of 
earnings management via either short-term or long-term discretionary accruals, the 
Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]) examines both simultaneously 
through the inclusion of two dummy variables; one representing earnings management 
via short-term earnings management and the other representing earnings management 
via long-term discretionary accruals. 
4.5.3.1 Hypothesis 3 
The coefficient on the intercept dummy for earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals is significant at the 10% level for the pooled sample. This 
suggests that this source of earnings management is value-relevant in its own right, and 
not just when interacting with earnings and book value. The negative coefficient 
indicates that firms engaging in earnings management via long-term discretionary 
accruals are expected to have a lower stock price than firms that do not engage in this 
type of earnings management. This finding is consistent with the descriptive statistics 
presented in Section 4.3. 
The regression results from Equation [2] reported in Tables 4-23 and 4-24 indicate 
support for Hypothesis 3, which states that earnings management via long-term 
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discretionary accruals has a greater effect on the value-relevance of earnings and book 
value than earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals. The coefficient 
β3, which represents the impact of earnings management on the value-relevance of 
earnings, is -2.93 for the short-term model and -5.59 for the long term model. 
Conversely, the coefficient β5, which represents the impact of earnings management on 
the value-relevance of book value, is 0.23 for the short-term model and 0.39 for the 
long-term model. The coefficients have greater magnitude in the long-term model, 
suggesting that earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals has a greater 
impact on value-relevance than earnings management via short-term discretionary 
accruals. 
Equation [3] was estimated in order to assess more accurately the differential impact of 
short-term and long-term discretionary accruals. Table 4-26 presents the results of the 
OLS regressions for the pooled sample and by year. Consistent with the estimations of 
the Value-relevance Model and the Earnings Management Model, the market’s response 
to earnings in the absence of earnings management is positive and significant (φ3 = 8.09, 
p = 0.000). Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals reduces this 
response by 4.38 (φ5 = -4.38, p = 0.019). The coefficient on the interaction variable for 
earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals is not significant, therefore 
indicating that this form of earnings management has no impact on the value-relevance 
of earnings. For firms that manage earnings using long-term discretionary accruals, the 
market’s response to earning is reduced from 8.09 to 3.71.  
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Table 4-26   Extended-Earnings-Management Model 
Earnings Management via Short-term and Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
Equation [3]: Pt = φ0 + φ1St + φ2 Lt + φ3 Et + φ4 EtSt + φ5 EtLt + φ6 BVt + φ7 BVtSt + φ8 BVtLt + ξ   
Sample Adj R2 φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7 φ8 n 
Pooled 0.606  0.10 -0.31 8.09 -2.54 -4.38 0.80 -0.14 0.84 778 
  (0.62) (1.96)* (4.92)*** (1.40) (2.36)** (5.24)*** (0.48) (2.72)***  
1997 0.791  0.10 -0.60 5.90 -2.64 -1.16 0.81 -0.07 1.42 136 
  (0.51) (3.19)*** (2.45)** (1.13) (0.48) (4.29)*** (0.20) (3.40)***  
1998 0.603  -0.27 0.30 6.44 -8.01 -0.92 1.40 0.97 -0.97 146 
  (1.26) (1.28) (1.66)* (2.64)*** (0.25) (2.63)*** (1.92)** (7.55)***  
1999 0.614  0.89 -0.80 13.49 0.86 -10.62 0.69 -1.12 1.56 136 
  (1.21) (1.26) (3.22)*** (0.08) (1.31) (2.30)** (0.70) (1.24)  
2000 0.697  0.17 -0.30 6.14 -0.27 -5.10 0.65 -0.42 1.12 184 
  (1.27) (2.27)** (5.17)*** (0.14) (3.14)*** (4.58)*** (1.47) (4.84)***  
2001 0.457  -0.11 -0.22 4.38 -1.72 -1.08 0.67 -0.05 1.36 176 
  (0.55) (1.50) (1.56) (0.70) (0.39) (2.87)*** (0.12) (1.43)  
Notes:           
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.      
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
St - Earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles)    
Lt - Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles)    
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t       
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t        
Pt - Stock price at time t + 3 months        
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The market’s response to book value in the absence of earnings management is also 
positive and significant (φ6 = 0.80, p = 0.000). The coefficient on the short-term 
interaction variable for book value is not significant, suggesting that earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals does not influence the value-
relevance of book value. However, the coefficient on the long-term interaction variable 
for book value is significantly positive (φ8 = 0.84, p= 0.007). Thus, when firms manage 
earnings via long-term discretionary accruals it is expected that the market’s response to 
book value will increase from 0.80 to 1.84. 
The test of Hypothesis 3 requires a comparison of the estimated coefficients of the 
short-term and long-term interaction variables. As the magnitude of the coefficients on 
the long-term interaction variables are greater than the coefficients on the short-term 
interaction variables, there is preliminary support for the hypothesis that long-term 
discretionary accruals have a greater impact on the value-relevance of earnings and 
book value than short-term discretionary accruals.  
A Wald test is used to make a more formal comparison of the coefficient estimates. The 
null of Hypothesis 3 states that there is no difference between the coefficients for the 
short-term and long-term interaction variables. There are two sets of interaction 
variables to be tested; the interaction of earnings management with earnings per share 
and the interaction of earnings management with book value per share. The Wald test is 
applied to each of these interactions separately and also to test the joint restriction. The 
results of these tests are presented in Table 4-27. 
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Table 4-27  Hypothesis 3: Wald Tests 
 H30:  φ4 = φ5  H30:  φ7 = φ8  H30:  φ4 = φ5, φ7 = φ8 
 H31:  φ4 > φ5  H31:  φ7 < φ8  H31:  φ4 > φ5, φ7 < φ8 
 χ2  χ2  χ2 
Pooled 14.53***  6.92***  56.12*** 
1997 3.71*  3.28*  21.73*** 
1998 4.02**  0.28  8.15** 
1999 1.14  1.25  28.04*** 
2000 6.31**  12.03***  43.50*** 
2001 1.93  1.94  3.50 
Notes:      
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
The joint restriction requires two relationships to hold; (1) the coefficient on the 
earnings interaction term for earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals 
is less than the coefficient on the earnings interaction term for earnings management via 
short-term discretionary accruals, and (2) the coefficient on the book value interaction 
term for earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals is greater than the 
coefficient on the book value interaction term for earnings management via short-term 
discretionary accruals. The Wald test of the joint restriction is significant for the pooled 
sample and for four of the five years individually, indicating that earnings management 
via long-term discretionary accruals has a greater effect on the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value than earnings management via short-term discretionary 
accruals. 
4.5.3.2 Hypothesis 2B and Hypothesis 2C 
The Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]) can also be used to test 
Hypotheses 2B and 2C. When earnings are managed via short-term discretionary 
accruals, the impact on the value-relevance of earnings and book value is reflected in 
the coefficients φ4 and φ7 respectively. Neither of these coefficients is significant for 
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Equation [3], thus there is no support for Hypothesis 2B. However, the model does 
provide support for Hypothesis 2C. When earnings are managed via long-term 
discretionary accruals, the impact on the value-relevance of earnings and book value is 
reflected in the coefficients φ5 and φ8 respectively. The significant negative coefficient 
(φ5 = -4.38, p = 0.019) on the earnings interaction variable indicates that the value-
relevance of earnings declines in the presence of earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals. The significant positive coefficient (φ5 = 0.84, p = 0.007) on the 
book value interaction variable indicates that the value-relevance of book value 
increases in the presence of earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals.  
4.5.3.3 Assessing the Assumptions 
Table 4-28 presents a comparison of standard t-statistics for Equation [3] with those 
calculated using White’s standard errors to control for possible heteroscedasticity. The 
only difference in results is the coefficient on the interaction of earnings with earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals (φ4). The coefficient is significant 
when using standard t-statistics but insignificant when the using t-statistics calculated 
using White’s standard errors. The Wald statistics presented in Table 4-29 indicate 
support for Hypothesis 3 regardless of the method used to calculate the t-statistics. That 
is, long-term discretionary accruals have a greater impact on the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value than short-term discretionary accruals.  
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Table 4-28   The Impact of Earnings Management via Short-term and Long-term Discretionary Accruals on the Value-relevance of 
Earnings and Book Value: A Comparison of Results Using White’s t-statistics  
Equation [3]: Pt = φ0 + φ1St + φ2 Lt + φ3 Et + φ4 EtSt + φ5 EtLt + φ6 BVt + φ7 BVtSt + φ8 BVtLt + ξ   
Sample Adj R2 φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7 φ8 n 
Pooled 0.605 0.10 -0.31 8.09 -2.54 -4.38 0.80 -0.14 0.84 778 
Standard  (0.80) (2.54)** (12.68)*** (3.22)*** (5.60)*** (9.87)*** (0.89) (5.62)***  
White#  (0.62) (1.96)* (4.92)*** (1.40) (2.36)** (5.24)*** (0.48) (2.72)***  
Notes:           
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.      
St - Earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles)    
Lt - Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles)    
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t       
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t        
Pt - Stock price at time t + 3 months        
#  t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors     
 
Table 4-29  Hypothesis 3: Wald Tests Using White Standard Errors 
 H30:  φ4 = φ5  H30:  φ7 = φ8  H30:  φ4 = φ5, φ7 = φ8 
 H31:  φ4 > φ5  H31:  φ7 < φ8  H31:  φ4 > φ5, φ7 < φ8 
 χ2  χ2  χ2 
Standard 74.437***  23.056***  222.830*** 
White# 14.529***  6.918***  56.122*** 
Notes:      
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
#  Regression t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
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4.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
4.6.1 Control variables 
Section 3.6 discussed the need to control for known determinants of the value-relevance 
of earnings and book value. The three variables used in this study are leverage, return 
on equity and negative earnings. These variables were included as additional 
explanatory variables in Equations [1], [2], and [3], to create Equations [1a], [2a], and 
[3a] respectively. 
Table 4-30 reports a comparison of the regression results for Equation [1] and Equation 
[1a]. The coefficients on leverage and negative earnings are positive and significant. 
This result is somewhat surprising as it suggests stock price will increase as a firm’s 
debt ratio increases and if it has negative earnings. The coefficient for return on equity 
is not significant. This may reflect the possibility of a non-linear relationship with 
earnings and book value that is not captured in this model. The coefficients for leverage 
and negative earnings are similar for all models. However, in Equations [2a] and [3a], 
the coefficient for return on equity is significant. The coefficient is positive in Equation 
[2a] when examining earnings management via total or long-term discretionary 
accruals, indicating that firms are expected to have a higher stock price as return on 
equity increases. However, the coefficient on return on equity is negative in Equation 
[2a] when examining earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals. As 
with the coefficients on leverage and negative earnings, the direction of this coefficient 
is somewhat surprising as it suggests higher stock prices in the presence of lower return 
on equity.  
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The coefficient estimates for Equation [1a] provide support for Hypothesis 1. The 
coefficient on earnings is slightly higher while the coefficient on book value is slightly 
lower with the inclusion of the control variables. Nevertheless, the coefficients remain 
significant indicating the both earnings and book value are value-relevant. 
Table 4-30  Value-relevance Model: Impact of Control Variables 
Equation [1]: Pt = α0 + α1 Et + α2 BVt + ε 
Equation [1a]: Pt = α0 + α1 Et + α2 BVt + α3 LEVt + α4 ROEt + α5 NEt + ε 
Adj R2 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 n 
0.477 5.020 1.220    2900 
 (6.50)*** (9.24)***     
0.485 5.990 1.207 0.770 -0.076 0.546  
 (6.58)*** (8.86)*** (5.33)*** (0.22) (4.88)***  
Notes:       
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t 
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months 
A similar pattern is evident in the results for Equations [2a] and [3a], as reported in 
Tables 4-31 and 4-32 respectively. That is, the coefficient on earnings is higher while 
the coefficient on book value remains unchanged or is slightly lower. The inferences 
drawn from the models are unaffected by the inclusion of the control variables. In other 
words, Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C are rejected, while there is support for Hypothesis 3.  
The test of equation [2a] demonstrates that while earnings management via short-term 
or long-term discretionary accruals reduces the value-relevance of earnings, it has no 
impact on the value-relevance of book value.  
  
92
Table 4-31  Earnings Management Model: Impact of Control Variables 
Equation [2]: Pt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Et + β3 Et Dt + β4 BVt + β5 BVt Dt + ε 
Equation [2a]: Pt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Et + β3 Et Dt + β4 BVt + β5 BVt Dt + β6 LEVt + β7 ROEt + β8 NEt + ε 
 Adj R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 n 
Total 0.461 0.19 6.35 -2.02 1.12 0.38    1448 
Discretionary  (1.10) (7.57)*** (0.99) (5.04)*** (1.36)     
Accruals 0.470 0.14 7.31 -1.92 1.10 0.43 0.80 0.22 0.63  
  (0.84) (8.23)*** (0.94) (4.96)*** (1.62) (4.14)*** (2.71)*** (3.60)***  
           
Short-term 0.608 -0.05 5.79 -2.93 1.05 0.23    1459 
Discretionary  (0.55) (6.25)*** (2.45)** (9.42)*** (1.38)     
Accruals 0.618 -0.09 6.45 -2.70 1.03 0.25 0.77 -0.07 0.43  
  (0.97) (6.57)*** (2.27)*** (9.35)*** (1.49) (5.52)*** (2.67)*** (4.60)***  
           
Long-term 0.525 -0.15 7.14 -5.59 1.12 0.39    1492 
Discretionary  (1.06) (5.71)*** (4.13)*** (4.37)*** (1.35)     
Accruals 0.531 -0.16 7.93 -5.50 1.12 0.39 0.63 0.04 0.47  
  (1.23) (5.70)*** (4.08)*** (4.31)*** (1.36) (4.63)*** (2.23)** (3.23)***  
Notes:           
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Dt - Earnings management via short-term/long-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles) 
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t 
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t 
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months 
LEVt – Leverage 
ROEt - Return on Equity  
NEt - Negative Earnings 
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Table 4-32  Extended-Earnings-Management Model: Impact of Control Variables 
Equation [3]: Pt = φ0 + φ1St + φ2 Lt + φ3 Et + φ4 EtSt + φ5 EtLt + φ6 BVt + φ7 BVtSt + φ8 BVtLt + ξ     
Equation [3a]: Pt = φ0 + φ1St + φ2 Lt + φ3 Et + φ4 EtSt + φ5 EtLt + φ6 BVt + φ7 BVtSt + φ8 BVtLt + φ9 LEVt + φ10 ROEt + φ11 NEt + ξ   
Adj R2 φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7 φ8 φ9 φ10 φ11 n 
0.605  0.10 -0.31 8.09 -2.54 -4.38 0.80 -0.14 0.84    778 
 (0.62) (1.96)* (4.92)*** (1.40) (2.36)** (5.24)*** (0.48) (2.72)***     
0.612 0.05 -0.26 8.51 -2.46 -4.20 0.80 -0.11 0.79 0.61 0.14 0.34 778 
 (0.33) (1.68)* (5.03)*** (1.35) (2.27)** (5.40)*** (0.37) (2.61)*** (3.81)*** (2.32)** (2.70)***  
Notes:             
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.        
St - Earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles)      
Lt - Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles)      
Et  -  Earnings before extraordinary items per share at time t         
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t          
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months          
LEVt – Leverage          
ROEt - Return on Equity           
NEt - Negative Earnings          
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The coefficient estimates for Equation [3a] indicate that earnings management via long-
term discretionary accruals has an impact on both earnings and book value while 
earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals has no effect. However, the 
impact on the value-relevance of earnings and book value is reduced with the inclusion 
of the control variables in the model.   
The test of Hypothesis 3 requires the application of a Wald test to the estimated 
coefficients. The results presented in Table 4-33 indicate that the inclusion of the 
control variables do not change the inferences drawn from the coefficients in Equation 
[3]. The Wald tests for Equation [3a] provide support for Hypothesis 3, which states that 
long-term discretionary accruals have a greater impact on the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value than short-term discretionary accruals.  
Table 4-33   Hypothesis 3 Wald Tests: Impact of Control Variables 
 H30:  φ4 = φ5  H30:  φ7 = φ8  H30:  φ4 = φ5, φ7 = φ8 
 H31:  φ4 > φ5  H31:  φ7 < φ8  H31:  φ4 > φ5, φ7 < φ8 
 χ2  χ2  χ2 
Equation [3] 14.53***  6.92***  56.12*** 
Equation [3a] 15.51***  6.62***  57.72*** 
Notes:      
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
These results demonstrate that after controlling for known influences on the relative 
value-relevance of earnings and book value, the inferences drawn from the original 
models are unchanged. Consequently, it can be concluded that the changes in the value-
relevance of earnings and book value are driven by earnings management and not the 
firm’s leverage, return on equity nor the presence of negative earnings. 
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4.6.2 Earnings Management Allocation by Median Benchmark 
The analysis discussed in Section 4.5 used industry quartiles to determine the allocation 
of firms as either managing earnings or not. An alternative approach is to allocate firms 
on the basis of the industry median. That is, firms with absolute discretionary accruals 
above the industry median are deemed to manage earnings, whilst those below the 
industry median are assumed to not manage earnings. The quartile allocation was used 
to provide greater distinction between the two groups. However, further analysis 
indicates that estimation using the median allocation provides similar results. 
Table 4-34 presents a comparison of results of the estimation of Equation [2] based on 
the alternative earnings management allocation methods. When using the median 
allocation method, the estimated coefficients on the earnings management interaction 
terms are not significant for total or short-term discretionary accruals. This indicates 
that earnings management via total or short-term discretionary accruals does not 
influence the value-relevance of earnings or book value. This is in contrast to the 
findings when using quartiles as the allocation basis. The lack of significance for the 
coefficients on the earnings management interaction variables is undoubtedly due to the 
lack of variability in the earnings management dummy variable. By using the industry 
median as the benchmark, the sample has simply been split into two.  
In contrast, for earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals, the 
inferences drawn from the estimated coefficients are not affected by the use of the 
median as the allocation basis. This suggests that the market is more sensitive to 
changes in long-term discretionary accruals than it is to changes in short-term 
discretionary accruals. As short-term accruals are expected to reverse within one 
accounting period, the market may assume that management would be reluctant to 
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attempt to conceal earnings management within short-term discretionary accruals. 
However, as long-term accruals tend to reverse further into the future, thus providing 
management with the opportunity to conceal their manipulations for longer, the market 
may be more cognizant of the use of long-term discretionary accruals. 
 
Table 4-34  Earnings Management Model:  
Alternate Earnings Management Allocation Methods 
Equation [2]: Pt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Et + β3 Et Dt + β4 BVt + β5 BVt Dt + ε   
 Adj R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 n 
Earnings Management via Total Discretionary Accruals 
Quartiles 0.461 0.19 6.35 -2.02 1.12 0.38 1448 
  (1.10) (7.57)*** (0.99) (5.04)*** (1.36)  
Median 0.479 0.272 5.402 -0.521 1.231 -0.030 2900 
  (2.25)*** (7.80)*** (0.37) (7.30)*** (0.14)  
Earnings Management via Short-term Discretionary Accruals 
Quartiles 0.608 -0.05 5.79 -2.93 1.05 0.23 1459 
  (0.55) (6.25)*** (2.45)** (9.42)*** (1.38)  
Median 0.477 0.07 4.85 0.23 1.24 -0.02 2900 
  (0.61) (7.17)*** (0.20) (9.45)*** (0.06)  
Earnings Management via Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
Quartiles 0.525 -0.15 7.14 -5.59 1.12 0.39 1492 
  (1.06) (5.71)*** (4.13)*** (4.37)*** (1.35)  
Median 0.491 -0.13 7.45 -4.84 1.07 0.25 2900 
  (1.18) (5.24)*** (3.28)*** (5.17)*** (1.13)  
Notes:        
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Et  -  Earnings per share at time t 
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t 
Pt - Stock price at time t + 3 months 
Dt - Earnings management via short-term or long-term discretionary accruals 
Quartiles – Earnings Management allocation by quartiles 
Median – Earnings Management allocation by median 
Table 4-35 compares the estimation of Equation [3] based on the alternative earnings 
management allocation methods. Quartile allocation gives a significant coefficient on 
the book value interaction term. The industry median allocation gives an insignificant 
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coefficient. However, Hypothesis 3 is not rejected as it tests the differential impact of 
earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals or via long-term 
discretionary accruals. The Wald tests (Table 4-36) supports Hypothesis 3. That is, 
earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals has a greater impact on the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value than earnings management via short-term 
discretionary accruals. 
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Table 4-35   Extended-Earnings-Management Model: Alternate Earnings Management Allocation Methods 
Equation [3]: Pt = φ0 + φ1St + φ2 Lt + φ3 Et + φ4 EtSt + φ5 EtLt + φ6 BVt + φ7 BVtSt + φ8 BVtLt + ξ    
 Adj R2 φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7 φ8 n 
Quartiles 0.605 0.10 -0.31 8.09 -2.54 -4.38 0.80 -0.14 0.84 778 
  (0.62) (1.96)* (4.92)*** (1.40) (2.36)** (5.24)*** (0.48) (2.72)***  
Median 0.491 0.09 -0.14 7.21 0.48 -4.87 1.09 -0.01 0.25 2900 
  (0.57) (1.06) (6.73)*** (0.30) (3.18)*** (6.27)*** (0.03) (0.94)  
Notes:           
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.       
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors      
St - Earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals       
Lt - Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals       
Et  -  Earnings per share at time t        
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t        
Pt - Stock price at time t + 3 months        
Quartiles – Earnings Management allocation by quartiles      
Median – Earnings Management allocation by median      
Table 4-36  Hypothesis 3 Wald Test: 
Alternate Earnings Management Allocation Methods 
 H30:  φ4 = φ5  H30:  φ7 = φ8  H30:  φ4 = φ5, φ7 = φ8 
 H31:  φ4 > φ5  H31:  φ7 < φ8  H31:  φ4 > φ5, φ7 < φ8 
 χ2  χ2  χ2 
Quartiles 14.53***  6.92***  56.12*** 
Median 15.26***  8.48***  54.94*** 
Notes:      
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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4.6.3 Alternative Measures of Earnings 
The preceding analysis was based on earnings measured as earnings before 
extraordinary items. It has been demonstrated that special or non-recurring items such 
as abnormal items and extraordinary items may be used to manage earnings (Elliott and 
Hanna 1996; Black et al 2000; Brewer et al 2002) Therefore, earnings before abnormal 
items and earnings after extraordinary items are also examined as the impact of earnings 
management on the value-relevance of earnings and book value may differ depending 
on the definition of earnings. 
The general effect of these alternatives on the value-relevance of earnings and book 
value is evident in the results for the Value-relevance Model (Equation [1]) presented in 
Table 4-37. The value-relevance of earnings declines as adjustments are made to 
earnings through abnormal and extraordinary items. On the other hand, these 
adjustments enhance the value-relevance of book value. Similarly, the explanatory 
power of the model declines as earnings is adjusted for abnormal and extraordinary 
items. These patterns are also evident in the results for the Earnings-Management 
Model (Equation [2]) and the Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]). 
This may be interpreted with reference to the general theory underlying this study. That 
is, as the reliability of earnings declines, the value-relevance of earnings declines and 
the value-relevance of book value increases. The implication is that adjustments via 
abnormal and extraordinary items reduce the reliability of earnings.  
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Table 4-37  Value-relevance Model: Alternative Measures of Earnings 
Equation [1]: Pt = α0 + α1 Et + α2 BVt + ε    
Earnings Measure Adj R2 α1 α2 n 
Earnings before Abnormal Items 0.495 7.23 0.99 2900 
  (6.32)*** (6.14)***  
Earnings before Extraordinary Items 0.477 5.02 1.22 2900 
  (6.50)*** (9.24)***  
Earnings after Extraordinary Items 0.474 4.66 1.26 2900 
  (6.19)*** (9.63)***  
Notes:     
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.  
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Pooled:  1997-2001     
The interaction variables in Equations [2] and [3] require re-calculation of the dummy 
variables for earnings management via total and long-term discretionary accruals as 
these measures are dependent on the definition of earnings. Equations [7] and [11], 
which provide the basis for calculating discretionary accruals, are re-estimated based on 
earnings before abnormal items and earnings after extraordinary items. The re-
estimation of Equation [9] for short-term discretionary accruals was not necessary as 
short-term accruals are independent of the measure of earnings. 
A comparison of the results for the Earnings-Management Model is presented in Table 
4-38. The conclusions drawn in the preceding analysis are unchanged for earnings 
management via total discretionary accruals and earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals. However, the impact of earnings management via short-term 
discretionary accruals is influenced by the definition of earnings. For earnings before 
extraordinary items, this form of earnings management reduces the value-relevance of 
earnings but has no effect on the value-relevance of book value.  
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Table 4-38  Earnings Management Model: Alternative Measure of Earnings 
Equation [2]: Pt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Et + β3 Et Dt + β4 BVt + β5 BVt Dt + ε   
Definition Adj R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 n 
Earnings Management via Total Discretionary Accruals 
Before Abnormal Items 0.477 0.27 6.86 1.79 1.05 -0.15 1448 
  (1.38) (7.44)*** (0.43) (4.51)*** (0.32)  
Before Extraordinary Items 0.461 0.19 6.35 -2.02 1.12 0.38  
  (1.10) (7.57)*** (0.99) (5.04)*** (1.36)  
After Extraordinary Items 0.458 0.16 6.22 -2.59 1.13 0.44  
  (0.98) (7.60)*** (1.48) (5.14)*** (1.57)  
Earnings Management via Short-term Discretionary Accruals 
Before Abnormal Items 0.632 -0.02 8.75 -4.68 0.74 0.39 1459 
  (0.19) (6.79)*** (2.64)*** (5.52)*** (1.93)*  
Before Extraordinary Items 0.608 -0.05 5.79 -2.93 1.05 0.23  
  (0.55) (6.25)*** (2.45)** (9.42)*** (1.38)  
After Extraordinary Items 0.606 -0.07 5.75 -3.32 1.06 0.27  
  (0.80) (6.20)*** (3.02)*** (9.51)*** (1.69)*  
Earnings Management via Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
Before Abnormal Items 0.530 -0.08 8.04 -4.55 0.99 0.32 1492 
  (0.57) (5.40)*** (2.44)** (3.49)*** (0.97)  
Before Extraordinary Items 0.525 -0.15 7.14 -5.59 1.12 0.39  
  (1.06) (5.71)*** (4.13)*** (4.37)*** (1.35)  
After Extraordinary Items 0.524 -0.15 7.02 -5.54 1.13 0.39  
  (1.11) (5.66)*** (4.28)*** (4.43)*** (1.34)  
Notes:    *, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
               t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
               Et  -  Earnings per share at time t  Pt - Stock price at time t + 3 months   
                BVt  -  Book value per share at time t  Dt - Earnings management (Allocation by quartiles)  
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When earnings is measured before abnormal items or after extraordinary items, earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals affects both earnings and book value. 
The coefficient on the earnings management interaction with book value is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that earnings management enhances the value-
relevance of book value. Thus, there is support for Hypothesis 2B, which states that the 
value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-relevance of book value is 
increased when firms manage earnings via short-term discretionary accruals. 
Table 4-39 presents a comparison of the results for the Extended-Earnings-Management 
Model. The inferences drawn from the estimated coefficients are consistent for earnings 
before extraordinary items and earnings after extraordinary items. However, when 
earnings is measured before abnormal items, earnings management has no impact on the 
value-relevance of earnings or book value regardless of whether it is achieved via short-
term or long-term discretionary accruals. 
The Wald tests presented in Table 4-40 show support for Hypothesis 3 for earnings 
before extraordinary items and earnings after extraordinary items. On the other hand, 
when earnings are measured before abnormal items, the Wald tests suggest a differential 
impact of short-term and long-term discretionary accruals in the opposite direction to 
that hypothesized.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 is rejected when earnings is measured before 
abnormal items. 
The lack of impact of extraordinary items may be due to the low incidence in this 
particular sample of firms. Nevertheless, this may also be expected in other samples as, 
by definition, extraordinary items should not be common. Application of these models 
to alternate data sets may reveal earnings management via extraordinary items.  
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Table 4-39   Extended-Earnings-Management Model: Alternative Measures of Earnings 
Equation [3]: Pt = φ0 + φ1St + φ2 Lt + φ3 Et + φ4 EtSt + φ5 EtLt + φ6 BVt + φ7 BVtSt + φ8 BVtLt + ξ 
Measure Adj R2 φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7 φ8 n 
Before Abnormal Items 0.618 0.11 -0.20 9.28 -4.36 -1.64 0.63 0.14 0.51 778 
  (0.70) (1.29) (4.64)*** (1.50) (0.60) (3.44)*** (0.35) (1.35)  
Before Extraordinary Items 0.606 0.10 -0.31 8.09 -2.54 -4.38 0.80 -0.14 0.84 778 
  (0.62) (1.96)* (4.92)*** (1.40) (2.36)** (5.24)*** (0.48) (2.72)***  
After Extraordinary Items 0.604 0.10 -0.31 7.87 -2.42 -4.22 0.82 -0.15 0.82 778 
  (0.65) (1.93)* (4.87)*** (1.53) (2.30)** (5.42)*** (0.52) (2.67)***  
Notes:           
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively.      
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors      
St - Earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles)      
Lt - Earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals (Allocation by quartiles)      
Et  -  Earnings per share at time t      
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t      
Pt - Stock price at time t + 3 months      
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Table 4-40  Hypothesis 3 Wald Tests: Alternative Measures of Earnings 
 H30:  φ4 = φ5  H30:  φ7 = φ8  H30:  φ4 = φ5, φ7 = φ8 
 H31:  φ4 < φ5  H31:  φ7 < φ8  H31:  φ4 < φ5, φ7 < φ8 
 χ2  χ2  χ2 
Earnings Before Abnormal Items 10.89***  1.12  58.00*** 
 
 H30:  φ4 = φ5  H30:  φ7 = φ8  H30:  φ4 = φ5, φ7 = φ8 
 H31:  φ4 > φ5  H31:  φ7 < φ8  H31:  φ4 > φ5, φ7 < φ8 
 χ2  χ2  χ2 
Earnings Before Extraordinary Items 14.53***  6.92***  56.12*** 
Earnings After Extraordinary Items 16.46***  7.99***  57.38*** 
Notes:      
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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4.7 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
The chapter presented the results of preliminary analysis and tests of the hypotheses 
based on a variety of assumptions. Table 4-41 summarizes the results of the hypothesis 
tests using the coefficient estimates from the pooled regression models. Significance of 
the coefficients was tested using t-statistics based on White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors.  
Table 4-41  Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis 1: Earnings and book value are value-relevant.  
H10: α1  = 0, α2  = 0 Reject 
H11: α1 > 0, α2  > 0 Do Not Reject 
Hypothesis 2A: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-relevance of 
book value is increased when firms manage earnings via total discretionary accruals. 
H2A0: β3  = 0, β5  = 0 Do Not Reject  
H2A1: β3  < 0, β5  > 0 Reject 
Hypothesis 2B: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-relevance of 
book value is increased when firms manage earnings via short-term discretionary 
accruals. 
H2B0: β3  = 0, β5  = 0 Do Not Reject  
H2B1: β3  < 0, β5  > 0 Reject 
H2B0: φ4 = 0 , φ7  = 0 Do Not Reject  
H2B1: φ4 < 0 , φ7  > 0 Reject 
Hypothesis 2C: The value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-relevance of 
book value is increased when firms manage earnings via long-term discretionary 
accruals. 
H2C0: β3  = 0, β5  = 0 Do Not Reject  
H2C1: β3  < 0, β5  > 0 Reject 
H2C0: φ5 = 0 , φ8  = 0 Reject 
H2C1: φ5 < 0 , φ8  > 0 Do Not Reject  
Hypothesis 3: The effect of long-term discretionary accruals on the value relevance of 
earnings and book value is greater than the effect of short-term discretionary accruals 
on the value relevance of earnings and book value. 
H30: φ4 = φ5 , φ7 = φ8 Reject 
H31: φ4 > φ5 , φ7 < φ8 Do Not Reject 
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Table 4-42 presents a comparison of the hypothesis test results based on the sensitivity 
analysis presented in Section 4.5. Different model estimations relate to variable 
definitions and the inclusion of control variables. 
The results indicate unconditional support for the Hypothesis 1, which states that both 
earnings and book value are value relevant. Similarly, Hypothesis 3 is supported under 
all assumption with the exception of when earnings per share is measured before 
abnormal items. Thus, it can be concluded that earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals has a greater impact on the value-relevance of earnings and book 
value than earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals.  
Tests using the coefficients from the Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]) lead 
to the rejection of Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C. That is, earnings management does not 
affect the value-relevance of earnings or book value. However, when earnings per share 
is measured before abnormal items or after extraordinary items, there is weak support 
for Hypothesis 2B. These results are based on tests using White’s t-statistics to control 
for heteroscedasticity. If the assumption of hetereoscedasticity is relaxed, the use of 
standard t-statistics generates significant coefficients on all variables in the Earnings 
Management Models. Thus, earnings management affects the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value. Further support for Hypothesis 2C is provided by the 
estimated coefficients from the Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]). 
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Table 4-42  Sensitivity Analysis - Comparison of Results 
Model Hypothesis 1 
Equation [1] 
Hypothesis 2A 
Equation [2] 
Hypothesis 2B 
Equation [2] 
Hypothesis 2C 
Equation [2] 
Hypothesis 2C 
Equation [3] 
Hypothesis 3 
Equation [3] 
Quartile Allocation for 
Earnings Management 
Do not reject Reject Reject Reject Do not reject Do not reject 
Median Allocation for 
Earnings Management 
Do not reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Do not reject 
Control Variables Do not reject Reject Reject Reject Do not reject Do not reject 
Before Abnormal Items Do not reject Reject Do not reject Reject Reject Reject 
After Extraordinary Items Do not reject Reject Do not reject Reject Do not reject Do not reject 
Standard t-statistics Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject 
Notes:        
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors unless otherwise stated 
Quartile Allocation for Earnings Management - Discussed in Section 4.5 
Median Allocation for Earnings Management - Discussed in Section 4.6.2 
Control Variables - Discussed in Section 4.6.1 
Before Abnormal Items - Discussed in Section 4.6.3 
After Extraordinary Items - Discussed in Section 4.6.3 
Standard t-statistics – Discussed in Sections 4.5.1.1, 4.5.2.4, & 4.5.3.3 
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In conclusion, there is some evidence to support the hypotheses presented in this study. 
Both earnings and book value are value-relevant using Australian data. Additionally, the 
value-relevance of earnings is reduced and the value-relevance of book value is 
increased when firms manage earnings via long-term discretionary accruals. Moreover, 
the differential impact of the different sources of earnings management is also 
supported. The effect of earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals on 
the value relevance of earnings and book value is greater than the effect of earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals on the value relevance of earnings 
and book value. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a discussion of the research, its conclusions, limitations, and the 
implications for future research and practice. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 provide a summary of 
the research objectives and the research conclusions respectively. Limitations of the 
research in terms of the validity the results are examined in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 
discusses the implications of this study for regulation, practice, education, and future 
research.  
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
The primary objective of this research was to examine the impact of earnings 
management on the value-relevance of earnings and book value. Three sources of 
earnings management were examined; (1) earnings management via total discretionary 
accruals, (2) earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals, and (3) 
earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals. Additionally, the research 
investigated the differential effect of short-term versus long-term discretionary accruals 
as the earnings management tool. 
As with prior research, the value-relevance of accounting information is assessed by 
examining the significance of the response coefficients on the accounting measures in a 
regression against stock price (Easton and Harris 1991; Dechow 1994; Sloan 1996). The 
literature examining the relative value-relevance of earnings and book value identifies 
circumstances in which the market shifts its reliance from earnings to book value (Barth 
et al 1998; Collins et al 1999; Ou and Sepe 2002). This study investigated the shift in 
reliance with respect to the reliability of earnings. The basic model in this study is a 
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linear equation with stock price as the dependent variable and earnings per share and 
book value per share as the independent variables.  
Earnings management was used as the indicator of reliability and was introduced to the 
model as an intercept dummy variable and as an interaction term with both earnings and 
book value. Consistent with prior research, this study used discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for earnings management (Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; Dechow 
1995).  
Total accruals were estimated as the difference between earnings and cash flows from 
operations. The Jones model (Jones 1991) was used to determine the discretionary 
component of accruals. This involved regressing total accruals against change in 
revenue and property, plant, and equipment. The estimated regression equation was 
used to calculate the expected level of total accruals. The difference between the actual 
accruals and this expectation was deemed to be discretionary component of total 
accruals.  
This procedure was repeated for short-term accruals and long-term accruals. Total 
accruals was divided into its short-term and long-term components. Separate models 
were developed from the Jones model for each accrual component. Short-term accruals 
were regressed against change in revenue. The estimated regression equation was used 
to calculate the expected level of short-term accruals. The difference between the actual 
short-term accruals and this expectation was deemed to be discretionary component of 
short-term accruals. Long-term accruals was regressed against property, plant, and 
equipment, intangibles, and non-current provisions. The estimated regression equation 
was used to calculate the expected level of long-term accruals. The difference between 
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the actual long-term accruals and this expectation was deemed to be discretionary 
component of long-term accruals. 
Discretionary accruals reflect accounting choices made by management. Some of these 
choices are made by management to provide a signal to the market about future firm 
performance. Other choices are motivated by the need to ensure earnings meet market 
expectations. Consequently, some discretionary accruals may reflect the opportunistic 
use of accruals to manage earnings. In this study, it is assumed that the excessive use of 
discretionary accruals indicates earnings management. As it is the magnitude rather than 
the direction of discretionary accruals that is indicative of earnings management, firms 
were ranked within each industry sector by the absolute value of their discretionary 
accruals (Becker et al 1998; Francis et al 1999; Krishnan 2003). A firm was deemed to 
manage earnings if was in the top quartile by industry. Conversely, firms in the bottom 
quartile were deemed to not manage earnings.  
The sample of firms consisted of those companies listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange with a June 30 balance date. Sample inclusion depended on the availability of 
both accounting and market data. Firms in the financial, insurance and banking 
industries were excluded due to industry-specific regulations that may influence accrual 
choices. The study covers the period from 1997 to 2001 inclusive. 
Hypothesis 1 tested the value-relevance of earnings and book value. Pooled OLS 
regression was used to estimate the Value-relevance Model (Equation [1]). The 
significance of the response coefficients on earnings and book value indicate that 
earnings and book value are value-relevant. Examination of the residuals from this 
model revealed the presence of heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the significance of the 
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coefficient estimates was assessed using White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. This approach was used for all pooled regressions in the study. 
The Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]) was used to test Hypotheses 2A, 2B, 
and 2C.  This model incorporated earnings management through the inclusion of an 
intercept dummy to measure the value-relevance of earnings management and slope 
dummies to measure the impact of earnings management on the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value. Similar to Hypothesis 1, these hypotheses required 
examination of the significance of the coefficient estimates from the pooled regression.  
Hypothesis 2A examined the impact of earnings management via total discretionary 
accruals. The results of the pooled regression indicated that this form of earnings 
management has no impact on the value-relevance of earnings and book value.  
Hypothesis 2B examined the impact of earnings management via short-term 
discretionary accruals. The coefficients from the pooled regression signified that this 
form of earnings management reduces the value-relevance of earnings but has no impact 
on the value-relevance of book value. It was hypothesized that earnings management 
would not only reduce the value-relevance of earnings, but also increase the value-
relevance of book value. Thus, Hypothesis 2B is not supported. 
Hypothesis 2C examined the impact of earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals. The coefficients from the pooled regression signified that this 
form of earnings management reduces the value-relevance of earnings but has not 
impact on the value-relevance of book value. Similar to Hypothesis 2B, it was 
hypothesized that earnings management would increase the value-relevance of book 
value. Thus, Hypothesis 2C is rejected. 
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The Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]) was used to test Hypothesis 
3 and as a secondary test of Hypotheses 2B and 2C. Hypothesis 3 tested the differential 
impact of earnings management via short-term versus long-term discretionary accruals. 
This is possible through the inclusion of dummy variables to represent each type of 
earnings management. The results of the pooled regression indicated that earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals has no impact, while earnings 
management via long-term discretionary accruals reduces the value-relevance of 
earnings and increases the value-relevance of book value. This provided support for 
Hypothesis 2C. Furthermore, it can be concluded that earnings management via long-
term discretionary accruals has a greater impact on the value relevance of earnings than 
earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals. A Wald test was applied to 
the estimated coefficients from Equation [3] in order to more formally test Hypothesis 
3. These results provided support for Hypothesis 3. 
Sensitivity analysis was undertaken to test the robustness of the results. The literature 
identifies return on equity, leverage, and negative earnings as three variables that 
influence the relative value-relevance of earnings and book value (Hayn 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Barth et al 1998; Penman 1998; Collins et al 1999). In 
order to identify more clearly the impact of earnings management, these variables were 
included in the models as control variables. The expanded models were estimated using 
pooled OLS and the original results of the hypothesis tests were unchanged by the 
inclusion of the control variables. It can therefore be concluded that it is earnings 
management driving the changes in the market’s reliance on earnings and book value. 
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Sensitivity analysis also included examination of the effect of an alternative method for 
earnings management allocation. The models were estimated first using the upper and 
lower quartiles as the benchmark for discretionary accruals and then using the industry 
median as the benchmark. All test results are unaffected by the use of the alternative 
measure of earnings management, with the exception of Hypothesis 2C when tested 
using Equation [3]. When using the median benchmark, this hypothesis was rejected. 
The final step in the sensitivity analysis involved the estimation of the models using 
alternative measures of earnings. The primary analysis used earnings before 
extraordinary items. Further analysis included earnings before abnormal items and 
earnings after extraordinary items. The use of earnings after extraordinary items did not 
alter the conclusion of the main analysis. However, the use of earnings before abnormal 
items results in the rejection of Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 2C when tested using 
Equation [3]. 
5.3 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS  
Table 5-1 provides a summary of the study’s propositions, hypotheses and key findings. 
5.3.1 Value Relevance 
The results in this study provided evidence of the value-relevance of earnings and book 
value for Australian firms. Whilst the response coefficients for both earnings and book 
value were positive and significant, they were slightly higher than found in US studies. 
This may be due to the different time period being examined or due to different market 
characteristics.  
  115
The main analysis was undertaken using earnings before extraordinary items. 
Sensitivity analysis examined the relative value-relevance of earnings and book value 
for alternative definitions of earnings, including earnings before abnormal items and 
earnings after extraordinary items.  
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Table 5-1(A)  Summary of Propositions, Hypotheses and Findings 
Proposition Hypothesis Earnings 
before 
extraordinary 
items 
Earnings 
before 
abnormal 
items 
Earnings 
after 
extraordinary 
items 
Earnings 
before 
extraordinary 
items, median 
allocation 
Earnings 
before 
extraordinary 
items, control 
variables 
P1: Earnings and book 
value are positively 
associated with firm value. 
H1: Earnings and book 
value are value-relevant. 
Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject 
P2: Earnings management 
reduces the value-relevance 
of earnings and increases 
the value-relevance of book 
value. 
H2A: The value-relevance 
of earnings is reduced and 
the value-relevance of book 
value is increased when 
firms manage earnings via 
total discretionary accruals. 
Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
 H2B: The value-relevance 
of earnings is reduced and 
the value-relevance of book 
value is increased when 
firms manage earnings via 
short-term discretionary 
accruals. 
Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
 
  117 
Table 5-2(B)  Summary of Propositions, Hypotheses and Findings 
Proposition Hypothesis Earnings 
before 
extraordinary 
items 
Earnings 
before 
abnormal 
items 
Earnings 
after 
extraordinary 
items 
Earnings 
before 
extraordinary 
items, median 
allocation 
Earnings 
before 
extraordinary 
items, control 
variables 
 H2C: The value-relevance 
of earnings is reduced and 
the value-relevance of book 
value is increased when 
firms manage earnings via 
long-term discretionary 
accruals. 
(Tested using Equation [2]) 
Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject 
 H2C: The value-relevance 
of earnings is reduced and 
the value-relevance of book 
value is increased when 
firms manage earnings via 
long-term discretionary 
accruals. 
(Tested using Equation [3]) 
Do not reject Reject Do not reject Reject Do not reject 
Proposition 3: The effect of 
long-term discretionary 
accruals on the value 
relevance of earnings and 
book value is greater than 
the effect of short-term 
discretionary accruals on 
the value relevance of 
earnings and book value. 
H3: Earnings management 
via long-term discretionary 
accruals has a greater 
impact on the value-
relevance of earnings and 
book value than earnings 
management via short-term 
discretionary accruals. 
Do not reject Reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject 
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The explanatory power of the Value-relevance Model declined as earnings was adjusted 
for abnormal and extraordinary items. Specifically, the value-relevance of earnings 
declined as adjustments were made to earnings through abnormal and extraordinary 
items. However, these adjustments increased the value-relevance of book value. This 
implies that adjustments via abnormal and extraordinary items reduce the reliability of 
earnings. 
As the market reacts differently to each of these measures of earnings, the individual 
components of earnings may be value-relevant in their own right. This can be tested by 
disaggregating earnings in Value-relevance Model into earnings before abnormal and 
extraordinary items, abnormal items, and extraordinary items. Results of this 
investigation are presented in Appendix 3.  There is evidence that these components of 
earnings contain information relevant to firm valuation.  
This is a concern given that the abnormal component of earnings is no longer disclosed 
separately for Australian companies, but rather is buried within earnings from 
continuing operations. The potential problem is that this value-relevant information is 
no longer readily available to market participants. This may be compensated for by the 
reclassification of items that were previously considered abnormal, as now being 
extraordinary. Future research could investigate changes in the incidence of 
extraordinary items subsequent to the elimination of abnormal items. 
5.3.2 The Impact of Earnings Management 
The basic Value-relevance Model (Equation [1]) has an explanatory power of 47.7%. 
The inclusion of the earnings management information in the Earnings-Management 
Model (Equation [2]) increased the R-squared to 60.8% for earnings management via 
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short-term discretionary accruals and to 52.5% for earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals. However, for earnings management via total discretionary 
accruals, the explanatory power is reduced to 46.1%. The increase in explanatory power 
suggests that earnings management information is relevant to firm valuation. Moreover, 
the decomposition of accruals into short-term and long-term discretionary accruals 
provides more information than the use of aggregate discretionary accruals as the 
indicator of earnings management. 
The results of the pooled OLS regressions of the Earnings-Management Model lead to 
the rejection of Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C. Earnings management via total 
discretionary accruals has no impact on the value-relevance of book value or earnings. 
However, earnings management via either short-term or long-term discretionary 
accruals reduces the value-relevance of earnings and has no impact on the value-
relevance of book value.  
These results are consistent with the inferences drawn from the explanatory power of 
the models. That is, discretionary accruals contain more information when 
disaggregated into its short-term and long-term components. This is due to the 
differential use of these components of accruals. Different circumstances motivate 
management to either increase or decrease earnings. The incentive to increase earnings 
is usually the need to meet a specific benchmark such as zero earnings, previous year’s 
earnings, or an analyst forecast. Earnings management that decreases earnings is often 
aimed at reducing the tax expense or is used in conjunction with a series of “big-bath” 
write-offs to increase earnings in subsequent periods.  
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The mean short-term-discretionary accruals is positive. Similarly, the estimation of the 
regression equation for short-term discretionary accruals (Equation [9]) results in a 
positive intercept and a positive coefficient on change in revenue. This suggests that 
short-term discretionary accruals are used by management to increase earnings. 
Conversely, the mean long-term discretionary accruals for the sample is negative. The 
intercept and estimated coefficients are all negative in the regression equation for long-
term discretionary accruals (Equation [11]). This suggests that management uses long-
term accruals to reduce earnings. The insignificant results for total discretionary 
accruals may simply reflect positive short-term discretionary accruals being offset by 
negative long-term discretionary accruals. 
Although earnings management via either short-term or long-term discretionary 
accruals impacts on the value-relevance of earnings, there is no effect on the value-
relevance of book value. The decline in value-relevance of earnings in the presence of 
earnings management reveals that the market perceives earnings management as an 
indicator of low earnings reliability. The assumption underlying Proposition 2 is that the 
market would look to alternate sources of information when the reliability of earnings 
declines. The lack of impact on book value may reflect a fixation on earnings. The 
market may react to low reliability of earnings by discounting the earnings figure, but 
making no change to reliance on other sources of information. Alternatively, the lack of 
impact on the value-relevance of book value may simply indicate that the market looks 
to information other than book value to compensate for low earnings reliability. 
Hypotheses 2B and 2C are also tested using the estimated coefficients from the 
Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]). The coefficients on the 
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interaction variables for earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals 
were not significant and therefore do not support Hypothesis 2B. However, the 
coefficients on the interaction variables for earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals were significant. Thus, there is support for Hypothesis 2C which 
states that earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals reduces the value-
relevance of earnings and increases the value-relevance of book value. This is in 
contrast to the findings based on the coefficients from the Earnings-Management Model 
(Equation [2]) which focuses on total accruals only.  
The Earnings-Management Model evaluates the impact of only one source of earnings 
management at a time, whereas the Extended-Earnings-Management Model 
incorporates variables to represent both sources of earnings management. The impact of 
earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals may become significant only 
when earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals is controlled for.  
Sensitivity analysis included the re-estimation of the models using the earnings 
management indicator based on the industry median rather than industry quartiles as the 
allocation benchmark. Generally, this alternate benchmark had little impact on the 
results of the hypothesis tests with the exception of the interaction variable for earnings 
via short-term discretionary accruals. Using the median benchmark, the coefficient was 
insignificant. Another exception, when using the median benchmark, is for the test of 
Hypothesis 2C using the Extended-Earnings-Management Model. Earnings 
management via long-term discretionary accruals only impacts to reduce the value-
relevance of earnings, but has no impact on the value-relevance of book value. This is in 
contrast to the impact on book value that was evident when the earnings management 
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indicator was based on the quartile benchmarks. These changes to the results of the 
hypothesis tests indicate that, as intended, the quartile allocation technique provided a 
stricter test of earnings management, thus enhancing the power of the tests. 
The effect of earnings management on the value-relevance of earnings and book value 
is sensitive to the definition of earnings. The primary results reported in this study are 
based on earnings before extraordinary items. The models were also estimated using 
earnings before abnormal items and earnings after extraordinary items. The different 
measures of earnings were used for the earnings variable in the model as well as for the 
estimation of total and long-term discretionary accruals. The calculation of short-term 
accruals is independent of the definition of earnings. 
The regression results are very similar for all measures of earnings. This is not 
surprising for earnings before and after extraordinary items as by definition, 
extraordinary items are not common. For most of the firms in the sample, earnings 
before extraordinary items and earnings after extraordinary items are the same figure. In 
fact, in the sample of 2900 firm observations, only 1% had negative extraordinary items 
and 0.7% had positive extraordinary items. Similar to the use of extraordinary items, 
abnormal items were used predominantly to reduce earnings. However, the incidence of 
abnormal items is considerably higher than the incidence of extraordinary items. In the 
sample, 33.6% of firm observation had negative abnormal items whereas 12.2% had 
positive abnormal items.  
The effect of the alternative measures of earnings on the value-relevance of earnings 
and book value is similar for the Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]) to that 
found for the Value-relevance Model (Equation [1]). As earnings is adjusted for 
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abnormal and then extraordinary items, the explanatory power of the model is enhanced, 
the value-relevance of earnings declines, and the value-relevance of book value 
increases.  
The impact of earnings management for the alternative definitions of earnings depends 
on the source of earnings management. In line with the main analysis, earnings 
management via total discretionary accruals has no impact on the value-relevance of 
earnings or book value. Therefore, regardless of the definition of earnings, Hypothesis 
2A is rejected.  
The impact of earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals is influenced 
by the definition of earnings used in the model. The impact on earnings is greatest when 
earnings is measured before abnormal items and least when earnings is measured after 
abnormal items, that is, before extraordinary items. This should be interpreted with 
reference to the value-relevance of earnings in the absence of earnings management 
which is also greatest when earnings is measured before abnormal items. However, 
while the adjustment for extraordinary items reduces the value relevance of earnings in 
the absence of earnings management, it increases the impact of earnings management. 
Moreover, when earnings is measured before abnormal items or after extraordinary 
items there is a positive impact on the value-relevance of book value. In other words, 
for these measures of earnings, earnings management via short-term discretionary 
accruals reduces the value-relevance of earnings and increases the value-relevance of 
book value. It should be noted that the estimated coefficients are only significant at the 
10% level. These results provide some support for Hypothesis 2B.  
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In contrast to the findings for the short-term model, the use of alternative definitions of 
earnings does not alter the inferences relating to earnings management via long-term 
discretionary accruals. However, it is interesting to note that the impact of earnings 
management via long-term discretionary accruals moves in the opposite direction to that 
found for earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals. When earnings is 
adjusted for abnormal items, the impact of earnings management on earnings increases. 
Conversely, when earnings is adjusted for extraordinary items, the impact on earnings 
management on earnings declines slightly. Regardless of the measure of earnings, 
earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals had no impact on the value-
relevance of earnings. Therefore, Hypothesis 2C is rejected for all definitions of 
earnings.  
5.3.3 Short-term versus Long-term Discretionary Accruals 
The Extended-Earnings-Management Model (Equation [3]) includes an earnings 
management interaction variable for both earnings management via short-term 
discretionary accruals and for earnings management via long-term discretionary 
accruals. The estimated coefficients were significant for earnings management via long-
term discretionary accruals but insignificant for earnings management via short-term 
discretionary accruals. This may indicate that while the market can identify and react to 
earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals, it is fooled by earnings 
management via short-term discretionary accruals. However, this is unlikely to be the 
case, as earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals proved to have a 
significant impact on value-relevance when it was examined in isolation in the 
Earnings-Management Model (Equation [2]).  
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A Wald test was applied to the estimated coefficients to formally assess the differential 
impact of these two forms of earnings management. It was found the earnings 
management via long-term discretionary accruals had a significantly greater impact on 
the value-relevance of earnings and book value than did earnings management via short-
term discretionary accruals.  The differential impact indicates that the market is able to 
distinguish between short-term and long-term accrual choices.  
There are a number of possible reasons why the market reacts more strongly to earnings 
management via long-term discretionary accruals than earnings management via short-
term discretionary accruals. One possible reason, that the market is fooled by the use of 
short-term discretionary accruals, has already been dismissed. The nature of the two 
types of discretionary accruals may provide some insight. As previously discussed, 
short-term discretionary accruals are on average positive whereas long-term 
discretionary accruals tend to be negative. The market may look less favorably on the 
use of accruals to decrease earnings than those used to increase earnings, and thus react 
more strongly. Additionally, the market may be less concerned about short-term 
discretionary accruals as they expect these accruals to reverse next period. The long-
term discretionary accruals may have an impact on earnings over a longer time horizon 
and therefore are of greater concern to the market.  
The results from the main analysis are robust for the inclusion of the control variables 
and the use of the industry median as the earnings management allocation benchmark. 
However, when earnings were measured before abnormal items, there was no impact on 
the value-relevance of earnings or book value from either source of earnings 
management. This suggests that the market perceives this earnings measure to be 
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reliable. While earnings before abnormal items undoubtedly contain discretionary 
accruals, the market may view these accruals as an informative signal rather than an 
indication of opportunistic behavior by management. The significance of the impact of 
earnings management when earnings are adjusted for abnormal or extraordinary items 
implies that the market may perceive these items as containing discretionary accruals 
that have been used opportunistically by management. Accordingly, the conflicting 
results for the alternative definitions of earnings may provide some insight into the 
source of earnings management and be of interest for future research.  
5.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Possible limitations of the research must be acknowledged when interpreting the results 
of this study. These limitations relate primarily to threats to the validity of the research. 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) provide guidance to the evaluation of the general threats 
to validity. They classify these as threats to internal and external validity. Cook and 
Campbell (1979) extend the classification to include threats to statistical conclusion 
validity and construct validity, although these threats are often presented as internal 
validity issues. 
5.4.1 Threats to Internal Validity 
Internal validity relates to the certainty with which statements can be made about the 
relationships between the variables as measured in the research. As this study is not an 
experiment, many of the traditional threats to internal validity are not present. 
The general threats to internal validity have been minimized through the use of control 
variables in the regression models. These variables were included to control for known 
determinants of the relative value-relevance of earnings and book value. 
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Mortality is a threat to internal validity that is an issue in this study, but not in the 
traditional sense. There is a temptation to include only firms that have data available for 
all 5 years of the analysis. However, when considering the research question it becomes 
evident that this would not be appropriate. It is possible that the firms most actively 
engaging in earnings management are doing so in order to conceal poor financial 
performance. Such firms may fail during the study period and would be excluded due to 
missing data. Alternately, new firms may be motivated to manage earnings in an 
attempt to attract investors. Exclusion of these firms from the analysis may remove the 
very firms that are the target of the research question and result in what is known as 
survivorship bias. 
Sample size is also a concern in terms of statistical conclusion validity which relates to 
the probability that the statistical results are representative of the actual relationships 
within the data set. The problem of low statistical power due to small sample size is 
addressed in this study by pooling the data. Due to the small number of firms listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange, all firms were considered for the original sample. Firms 
were then removed on the basis of missing data. This highlights the limitation of using 
an existing database as the data source. As reported by SIRCA, the firms missing data 
are primarily smaller firms that are not covered by the database. Although the initial 
selection of firms is based on convenience, random sampling was not used as it would 
have further reduced an already small sample size. 
Firms in the financial, banking and insurance industries were also removed, along with 
outlying observations for earnings and book value, and firms in industries with too few 
observations to run the regression analysis. The methods used to allocate firms as either 
having earnings management or not, also had an impact on the sample size. With the 
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use of the median as the benchmark for discretionary accruals, the total sample for the 
pooled regressions was 2900 firm observations. However, when the quartile benchmark 
was used, this number was reduced to 778 firm observations. 
Construct validity relates to the degree to which a variable measures what it purports to 
measure. Clear operational definitions of the measures used in this study are provided in 
sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. The issue of construct validity is of particular importance 
when variable measures are newly developed, as is the case in this study. Whilst the 
earnings, book value, and stock price variables have been used extensively in previous 
research, the short-term and long-term discretionary accrual measures have not. The 
existing literature was reviewed to provide guidance for the development of these 
measures. 
The disaggregation of total accruals into its short-term and long-term components has 
been previously developed (Wilson 1986; Dechow 1994; Cotter 1996; Loftus and Sin 
1997; Chia et al 1997; Guay and Sidhu 2001). Similarly, a variety of models have been 
developed to estimate discretionary accruals to represent earnings management (Healy 
1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; Dechow et al 1995). Drawing on these bodies of 
literature, a model was developed to determine the discretionary component of both 
short-term and long-term accruals.  
Mono-operational bias is another issue that must be addressed when evaluating 
construct validity. Although only one approach was adopted to determine the 
discretionary component of the short-term and long-term accruals, two alternative 
methods were applied to the resulting discretionary accruals to allocate firms as either 
managing earnings or not. The primary analysis of the results focuses on the quartile 
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benchmark for allocation purposes, however, the results from the use of the median 
benchmark were presented as part of the sensitivity analysis. Additionally, different 
measures of earnings were used as the basis for calculating accruals. The results are 
presented for each of these alternatives. 
The measure of value-relevance focuses on market perception by evaluating the 
relationship between the accounting information and stock price. However, it is unclear 
whether the market uses discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. 
The complexity of the models used to determine discretionary accruals suggests that the 
average investor would not be using this measure. Similarly, the market’s ability to 
distinguish between the short-term and long-term discretionary accruals is questionable. 
This research could be extended through the development of alternative models for the 
disaggregation of short-term and long-term accruals into the discretionary and non-
discretionary components. Moreover, different measures for earnings management 
could be investigated.  
5.4.2 Threats to External Validity 
External validity relates to the generalizability of results across populations, settings and 
times. The representativeness of the sample firms influences the degree of the 
generalizability. Thus, the exclusion of firms in the financial, banking and insurance 
industries reduces the generalizability of results to all publicly traded firms. Similarly, 
the smallest industries were excluded from the study due to lack of data. This provides 
an opportunity for further research into the behavior of discretionary accruals in 
regulated or small industries. 
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As Australian data has been used for this study, care should be taken in generalizing the 
results to stock markets in other countries due to regional economic influences. The 
Australian market and its firms may exhibit characteristics different from international 
markets in terms of size, number of firms or market capitalization. For example, the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has twice the number of firms as the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) but ten times the market capitalization. The largest ten firms 
listed on the NYSE have greater market capitalization than the entire ASX. 
Consequently, the NYSE would provide a richer data set with which to investigate the 
questions presented in this research. Nevertheless, there is a similarity in the results of 
this study with past research conducted in the US, thus indicating a degree of 
generalizability.  
5.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
5.5.1 Regulatory Implications 
To maintain earnings relevance in the face of financial fraud, regulators have taken 
action to ensure the integrity of accounting information. A primary source of accounting 
information for shareholders is management who theoretically should be well informed 
regarding the firm’s activities and performance. Yet management is motivated by self-
interest and incentives may exist to manipulate the information released, for example, 
through the manipulation of accruals to reach an earnings target. Such activity may 
mislead shareholders by providing accounting information that is not truly indicative of 
the financial position and performance of the firm. 
Although earnings management may not actually be deemed fraudulent, it is indicative 
of opportunistic behavior by management. Regulatory bodies such as the Australian 
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Stock Exchange (ASX), the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), 
and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) have a vested interest in monitoring the 
financial reporting process. Legislation has also acknowledged the need to monitor 
financial reporting (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002). 
This research provides further evidence of the existence of earnings management and its 
impact on the market. Consequently it provides support for ongoing regulatory activity 
aimed at effectively monitoring management in order to improve the integrity of the 
financial reporting process. Additionally, the models developed in this study will assist 
in the identification of earnings management with insights into the differential impact of 
short-term and long-term discretionary accruals. This distinction in the timing 
difference of discretionary accruals suggests a possible need for additional disclosure 
requirements. 
These findings may also provide further support for a principles-based approach to 
standard setting. A rule-based approach enables creative engineering of transactions 
which adhere to the rules whilst evading the intent of the standards. In recent years this 
has resulted in continuing refinements to the accounting standards to limit future 
manipulations. A principles-based approach requires a broader application of the 
principles thus reducing the likelihood of exceptions. Earnings management, as defined 
in this study, is the excessive use of discretionary accruals to manipulate the earnings 
figure. It should be noted that the intent of principles-based standard setting is not to 
eliminate the use of discretionary accruals but rather to ensure that such use is within 
the intent of the standards. Ideally, this would result in accruals that enhance the 
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information content of earnings thus improving the ability of market participants to 
make informed decisions about the allocation of capital resources.  
5.5.2 Practical Implications 
This research provides two key insights for market participants including investors, 
analysts, accounting and auditing professionals. These insights relate to the role of 
earnings management information in firm valuation and the market’s perception of 
accrual choices. 
Firstly, the results demonstrate that earnings management affects not only the 
informativeness of earnings but also of book value. This highlights the potential 
valuation error that may arise from a fixation on earnings, particularly if the reliability 
of the earnings figure has been compromised. The results indicate a shift away from 
earnings and toward book value as the basis for valuation in the presence of earnings 
management via long-term discretionary accruals. Thus a firm’s propensity to manage 
earnings is value relevant information that should be considered in the valuation 
process.  
Another contribution of this study is the evidence that the use of short-term or long-term 
discretionary accruals as the earnings management tool has a differential effect on the 
value-relevance of accounting information. Thus, practitioners must be cognizant of the 
market’s potential reaction to the accrual choices. Moreover, the models developed to 
distinguish between short-term and long-term discretionary accruals may provide 
market participants with guidance in the detection of different forms of earnings 
management.  
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5.5.3 Educational Implications 
With earnings management becoming the focus of regulator, standard setters and market 
participants, its integration into accounting education is essential. The analysis of 
financial statements is an important component of accounting courses at all levels. 
However, the results of this study are most relevant for financial statement analysis 
courses. 
Recent corporate collapses have led to the inclusion of corporate governance as a 
necessary topic in courses aimed at the evaluation of financial statements. This 
acknowledges the potential lack of reliability of accounting information. Earnings 
management is addressed in financial statement analysis textbooks in the context of the 
reliability of financial information. Much of the discussion of earnings management 
centers on the use of specific accruals to manage earnings. However, few texts address 
the issue of the detection of earnings management. Furthermore, no distinction is made 
between earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals and long-term 
discretionary accruals. The models developed in this study provide a tool for identifying 
whether or not a firm manages earnings and what type of accruals are used. This would 
be useful as a preliminary tool to assess the integrity of the financial statements.  
Earnings based models are typically the focus of firm valuation in financial statement 
analysis courses. This study provides further evidence of the role of book value. 
Furthermore, the results demonstrate the impact of earnings management on the value-
relevance of earnings and book value. This provides a significant link between the 
integrity of the accounting information and the usefulness of the information to market 
participants.  
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5.5.4 Research Implications 
This research provides a link between valuation and earnings management research. In 
this study, earnings management was used as an indicator of the reliability of earnings. 
The results provide evidence that low reliability of information reduces its value-
relevance. Further research could investigate other indicators of reliability that may 
influence the relative value-relevance of earnings and book value.  For example, recent 
activities in the corporate world clearly indicate that managers may behave 
opportunistically and require monitoring. This issue has been addressed through the 
introduction of corporate governance guidelines and regulations. Therefore, it would be 
of interest to examine the role of corporate governance in enhancing the reliability of 
information. 
The models that have been commonly used to detect earnings management primarily 
have a short-term focus. A major contribution of this study is the extension of these 
models to enable the estimation of short-term and long-term discretionary accruals. 
Most of the existing studies examining the role of short-term and long-term accruals 
focus on the direct value-relevance of these components. In contrast, this study 
investigates the moderating effect on the value-relevance of accounting information. 
Additionally, this study decomposed total accruals in order to examine the impact of the 
discretionary component rather than accruals as a whole. The results clearly 
demonstrate that the long-term component of discretionary accruals has a greater impact 
on the value-relevance of earnings and book value than short-term discretionary 
accruals. 
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The significant results in this study indicate that the discretionary accruals measures 
developed for short-term and long-term accruals contain information that is relevant to 
capital markets. Much of the existing research focuses on the effect of earnings 
management in contractual settings rather than capital markets. However, practitioners 
may be more interested in capital market incentives. 
The use of Australian data in this study contributes to both the valuation and earnings 
management literature. The similarity of results with previous research using US data 
demonstrates the generalizability of the findings to different markets. Replication of this 
research using data from other international stock exchanges may provide insight into 
market response to earnings management and its impact on firm valuation. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the limitations of the research by addressing the common threats 
to research validity. Furthermore, it presented the major contributions of the research in 
terms of regulatory, practical, educational, and research implications. The study links 
the valuation and earnings management literature by demonstrating the impact of 
earnings management on the relative value-relevance of earnings and book value.  
A further contribution of this study is the development of a model to determine the 
short-term and long-term components of discretionary accruals in order to examine the 
differential impact of these sources of earnings management. The results demonstrate a 
greater impact on value-relevance for earnings management via long-term discretionary 
accruals than for earnings management via short-term discretionary accruals. This 
suggests that the market is able to distinguish between short-term and long-term 
accruals choices. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1-1  
ASX Industry Sectors 
ASX Sector Description 
1 Gold 
2 Other metals 
3 Diversified Resources 
4 Energy 
5 Infrastructure and Utilities 
6 Developers and Contractors 
7 Building Materials 
8 Alcohol and Tobacco 
9 Food and Household 
10 Chemicals 
11 Engineering 
12 Paper and Packaging 
13 Retail 
14 Transport 
15 Media 
16 Banks and Finance 
17 Insurance 
18 Telecommunications 
19 Investment and Financial Services 
20 Property Trusts 
21 Healthcare and Biotechnology 
22 Miscellaneous Industrials 
23 Diversified Industrials 
24 Tourism and Leisure 
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APPENDIX 2 
The following tables present the results of the regressions used to estimate total, short-
term, and long-term accruals for ASX Industry Sector 22 (Miscellaneous Industrials). 
Table A2-1 
Estimation of Total Accruals Model for Industry 22 – Miscellaneous Industrials 
Equation [7]:  ACCt = ϕ1 + ϕ2∆REVt ϕ3PPEt + ε 
 Adj R2 ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ2 n 
Pooled 0.780 1,008,602.880 0.016 -0.109 611 
 (727.31)*** (46.58)*** (1.22) (5.78)***  
1997 0.245 -445,656.279 0.087 0.065 98 
 (11.77)*** (6.45)*** (4.22)*** (2.87)***  
1998 0.145 -434,136.860 0.003 -0.033 104 
 (6.95)*** (4.00)*** (0.09) (1.18)  
1999 0.244 330,601.631 0.028 0.027 116 
 (13.66)*** (4.22)*** (2.26)*** (0.41)  
2000 0.937 1,128,423.709 -0.024 -0.024 145 
 (810.66)*** (48.82)*** (2.85)*** (7.74)***  
2001 -0.201 -201,537.935 0.196 0.196 148 
 (-7.28) (2.65)*** (1.42) (1.04)  
Table A2-2  
Estimation of Short-term Accruals Model for Industry 22 – Miscellaneous 
Industrials 
Equation [9]:  STACCt = γ1 + γ2∆REVt + ε 
 Adj R2 γ1 γ2 n 
Pooled 0.743 1,157,033.308 0.150 611 
 (888.91)*** (28.85)*** (12.25)***  
1997 0.000 -253,127.746 0.104 98 
 (1.00) (1.12) (1.47)  
1998 0.925 163,667.165 0.407 104 
 (743.31)*** (1.02) (38.72)***  
1999 0.567 436,341.894 0.083 116 
 (78.58)*** (9.27)*** (8.38)***  
2000 0.954 1297083.466 -0.024 145 
 (1752.11)*** (59.43)*** (1.74)*  
2001 0.485 -54,229.047 0.193 148 
 (71.51)*** (1.27) (11.88)***  
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Table A2-3  
Estimation of Long-term Accruals Model for Industry 22 – Miscellaneous 
Industrials 
Equation [11]:  LTACCt = η1 + η2PPEt + η3INTt + η4NCPt + ε 
 Adj R2 η1 η2 η3 η4 n 
Pooled 0.682 -109,917.267 -0.324 -0.014 -0.688 611 
 (335.86)*** (3.44)*** (15.20)*** (1.07) (3.07)***  
1997 0.768 477,328.240 -0.590 -0.164 0.674 98 
 (85.90)*** (5.01)*** (15.65)*** (1.73)* (1.92)*  
1998 0.959 -412,249.514 -0.394 -0.061 -0.284 104 
 (813.35)*** (3.43)*** (9.12)*** (0.71) (0.77)  
1999 -0.034 82,884.819 -0.223 0.101 -0.137 116 
 (0.05) (1.24) (3.98)*** (1.91)* (0.42)  
2000 0.365 -238,911.689 -0.155 0.030 0.519 145 
 (22.09)*** (5.17)*** (2.86)*** (1.67)* (0.62)  
2001 0.064 -63,504.651 -0.426 -0.101 1.188 148 
 (3.55)*** (0.71) (5.39)*** (2.13)** (1.56)  
 
  146
APPENDIX 3 
The Value-relevance Model (Equation [1]) examines the value relevance of earnings 
and book value by examining the response coefficients from the regression estimation. 
Hypothesis 1 was tested using three alternative definitions of earnings; (1) Earnings 
before abnormal items, (2) Earnings before extraordinary items, and (3) Earnings after 
extraordinary items. The results revealed that the market reacts differently to each of 
these measures of earnings.  
Table A3-1 presents the results of regression estimations in which earnings is 
decomposed into three components. These components are earnings before both 
abnormal and extraordinary items, abnormal items, and extraordinary items. The 
purpose of this disaggregation is to examine the individual value-relevance of each 
component of earnings. 
The first model includes all three earnings components and book value as the 
explanatory variables. The results demonstrate the value-relevance of earnings before 
abnormal and extraordinary items, abnormal items, and book value. The extraordinary 
component of earnings is not value relevant in its own right.  
In the second model, the three earnings components are replaced with earnings before 
extraordinary items and extraordinary items per share. Earnings before extraordinary 
items and book value are both value-relevant at the 1% level. The coefficient on 
extraordinary items per share is significant at the 10% level, indicating weak support for 
the value-relevance of this component.  
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The third model uses earnings after extraordinary items in place of the three 
components. Both earnings and book value are value-relevant in this model.  
The change in the response coefficients and the explanatory power of the models 
demonstrate the impact of the disaggregation of earnings on its value-relevance and on 
the value-relevance of book value. The explanatory power of the model increases as 
earnings is disaggregated into its components. Similarly, there is an increase in the 
magnitude of the coefficients on the earnings components. Conversely, the response 
coefficient for book value declines as earnings is disaggregated. These results indicate 
that there is information content in the components of earnings.  
Table A3-1  
Value-relevance of Earnings Components and Book Value 
Pt = λ0 + λ1 EBAXt + λ2 ABNt  + λ3 XTt + λ4BVt + ε 
Adj R2 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 n 
0.495 7.22 0.89 0.24 0.99 2900 
 (6.29)*** (2.45)** (0.89) (6.14)***  
Pt = ψ0 + ψ1 EBXt + ψ2XTt + ψ3BVt + ε 
Adj R2 ψ1 ψ2 ψ3  n 
0.477 5.01 0.45 1.22  2900 
 (6.47)*** (1.66)* (9.23)***   
Pt = δ0 + δ1 E + δ2BVt + ε 
Adj R2 δ1 δ2   n 
0.474 4.66 1.26   2900 
 (6.19)*** (9.63)***    
Notes:      
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, two-tailed respectively. 
t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Pt - Stock price per share at time t + 3 months 
EBAXt  -  Earnings before Abnormal and Extraordinary Items per share at time t 
EBXt  -  Earnings after Abnormal and before Extraordinary Items per share at time t 
Et  -  Earnings after Abnormal and Extraordinary Items per share at time t 
ABNt  -  Abnormal Items per share at time t 
XTt  -  Extraordinary Items per share at time t 
BVt  -  Book value per share at time t 
 
 
